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FEDERAL REGULATION OF REAL ESTATE
INVESTMENT TRUSTS:
A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
WILLImA

L. MARTIN, IIt

I. INTRODUCTION

The real estate investment trust ("REIT") is an unincorporated
association or business trust managed by one or more trustees that
invests funds of a number of investors in real estate, mortgages
secured by real estate, or some combination thereof.' Although the
business trust as an organizational form has existed at least since the
nineteenth century, 2 it was not until after 1960, when Congress

passed legislation exempting qualified REITS from federal taxation,3 that the REIT gained widespread popularity as a real estate
investment vehicle.
f Division of Enforcement, United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1974. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
The Commission as a matter of policy disclaims responsibility for the private
publications of its employees. The views expressed herein are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Commission or any other members
of its staff.
IBEITs are typically classified into three categories, depending upon the composition of their portfolios. Equity BElTs invest directly in real estate interests,
typically income-producing properties such as apartments or shopping centers. Mortgage BEITs invest in mortgages secured in whole or in part by interests in real
estate. Hybrid BEITs purchase both equity interests and mortgages. Mortgage
trusts are sometimes further classified as short-term trusts-those that typically invest
in short-term construction and development ("C & D") mortgages-and long-term
trusts-those that invest in mortgages with long-term maturities typically secured by
completed real estate projects. See generally NATIONAL ASN OF REAL ESTATE
INVEsTm-,E
TRusms, BEIT FACTEOOK 6-10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BElT
F.AcTBoo, 1977].
2Most BElTs are organized as Massachusetts business trusts, a business form
that appears to have received judicial recognition in that jurisdiction as early as 1827.
See State Street Trust Co. v. Hall, 311 Mass. 299, 304, 41 N.E.2d 30, 34 (1942).
Other jurisdictions also appear to have recognized the business trust as a form of
commercial enterprise at an early date. See Annot., 156 A.L.R. 13, 28-30 & n.16
(1945) and cases cited therein.
3 I.R.C. §§ 856-858. To qualify for exemption from state and federal corporate
income taxes under the foregoing sections, a BEIT must meet a number of tests regarding types of investments, sources of income, and distributions to shareholders.
The principal requirements are as follows:
(1) At least 90 percent of the BEIT's gross income must be distributed to
shareholders (increasing to 95 percent in 1980);
(2) At least 75 percent of the BElT's assets must consist of interests in real
estate, loans secured by interests in real estate, shares in other BEITs, or cash and
cash equivalents;
(3) At least 75 percent of the BElT's gross income must be real estate-related,
including rents and interest;
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In passing the original legislation according qualified REITs
tax-exempt status, Congress' principal concern was to create parity
of tax treatment between REITs and regulated investment companies, or so-called mutual funds. Since 1936, qualified investment
companies had been permitted to "pass through" earnings to shareholders without incurring the normal income tax levied against
corporations and nonqualified investment companies. 4 The exemption was designed to promote investment by allowing small investors to secure expert investment advice and the economies of
scale associated with large transactions without burdening such an
investment vehicle with the customary double taxation imposed on
corporate dividendsY In exempting qualified REITs from normal
income taxation, Congress in 1960 sought to provide similar incentives for small investors in real estate.6
In seeking to ensure tax parity between REITs and investment
companies, however, Congress took no steps to assure regulatory
parity between the two types of enterprises. Since 1940, investment
companies had been subject to a comprehensive federal regulatory
scheme designed to protect investors from the panoply of abuses
found to exist in such companies. This regulatory scheme was
embodied in the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Investment
Company Act")7 and its companion act, the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 ("Investment Advisers Act")." Both acts sought, among
other things, to ensure that investors who entrusted their funds to
investment companies would not be subject to undue risk due to
imprudent financial structures, self-dealing, and conflicts of interest
generated by those charged with the management of fund assets. 9
(4) The BElT may not hold or develop real estate for sale to customers in the

ordinary course of business; and
(5) Beneficial ownership of the BElT must be held by no fewer than 100 shareholders for at least 335 days of a tax year, and five or fewer persons may not own
more than half of the outstanding stock during the last half of the taxable year.
See REIT FAcmoon, 1977, supra note 1, at 34.
4 See J. MERTENs, LAW oF FEDERAL INcoME TMx~AnoN § 41.02 (1976).
5 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 73, reprinted in [1954] U.S.
CODE CONG. & An. NEws 4099; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 101, -reprinted
in [1954] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 4734 (legislative history of 1954 Internal
Revenue Code).
6H.R. RPBn. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960); H.R. REP. No. 2842, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1956); S. REP. No. 2797, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1956).
7Ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (Currently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to
80a-52 (1976) ).
sId. 847 (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1976)).
9 For a succinct description of the background and regulatory objectives of the
Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act, see 1 L. Loss, SECUITIES REcurLAioN 144-55 (1961).
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By contrast, REITs were not in 1960, nor have they been at
any time since then, subject to comparable regulatory safeguards.
Section 3(c)(6) of the Investment Company Act' 0 exempted from
the provisions of the Act companies investing in real estate or mortgages secured by real estate.'1 The Securities and Exchange Commission has interpreted this provision to apply to most REITs.12
Various states have sought, through blue sky regulations, to impose
restrictions on REITs the shares of which are offered for sale within
the state; these regulations, however, have proved inadequate and
have not been broadly applied.' 3
This difference in regulatory treatment is anomalous given the
fact that REITs and investment companies, by virtue of their management structures and objectives, are highly similar. Hence, both
enterprises represent the pooled capital of a number of small investors; both seek to secure economies of scale for individual
investors by aggregating and managing large amounts of capital;
and, most significantly, both typically are managed, pursuant to
1oCh. 686, §3(c)(6), 54 Stat. 789, 798-99 (1940) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)(C) (1976)). Pursuant to the 1970 amendments to the Investment Company Act, §3(c)(6) became §3(c)(5)(C).
Pub. L. No. 91-547, §3,
84 Stat. 1413 (amending 15 U.S.C. §80a-3(c)(6) (1964)).
11 Section 3 (c)(6) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 excluded from the
definition of an investment company "[a]ny person who is not engaged in the business of issuing face-amount certificates of the installment type or periodic payment
plan certificates, and who is primarily engaged in .. .(C) purchasing or otherwise
acquiring mortgages and other liens on or interests in real estate." Investment
Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 3(c) (6), 54 Stat. 789, 798-99 (1940) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §80a-3(c)(5)(C) (1970)).
The legislative rationale for the inclusion of § 3(c) (6) is not altogether clear.
The Investment Company Act was, in large measure, a response to the findings of
the massive Study of Investment Trusts and Investment Companies completed by
the Securities and Exchange Commission and forwarded to Congress in 1939. Although the study included a comprehensive survey of almost 1200 investment companies then in existence, it appears that only one company was included that engaged in the acquisition of real estate-interests-Investors Syndicate, Inc., a face
amount certificate company. A reading of the hearings and conference reports
resulting from the ensuing congressional consideration of the proposed Investment
Company Act reveals virtually no discussion of the propriety of the exclusion of
real estate and mortgage companies, although the legislative history of subsequent
amendments to the Act would seem to indicate that these companies were excluded
simply because they do not fall within the generally-understood concept of investment companies "investing in stocks and bonds of corporate issuers." H.R. REP.
No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1970).
12 Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Securities Act Release No. 4298 (Nov. 18,
1960):
[I]n determining the applicability of the exception contained in Section
3(c)(6)(C), the character of the trust's assets must be considered. In
this respect, no question would be raised where a real estate investment
trust invested exclusively in fee interests in real estate or mortgages or
liens secured by real estate.

1 See notes 56-62 infra & accompanying text.
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advisory contracts, by external investment managers who are responsible, among other things, for investment recommendations,
financing decisions, and administration of the day-to-day affairs of
the enterprise. 14
The regulatory anomaly has been further heightened by the
high risk investment practices of REITs and their consequently
disastrous economic performance-both important factors in prompting the regulatory legislation originally directed at investment companies. Between 1968 and 1973, the annual number of REIT
offerings increased from fourteen to sixty-five 15 and total RET
assets increased from $1.03 billion to over $20 billion.', Much of
the growth during this period was financed by massive bank and
commercial paper borrowing by REITs,1 7 the proceeds of which
were in turn loaned to unseasoned developers to finance unproven
When, in late 1973 and
projects involving high degrees of risk.'
the effects of these
began
to
deteriorate,
estate
sector
1974, the real
practices proved disastrous. Within the space of two years, REIT
assets decreased from almost $21 billion to $16.5 billion,19 total
reserves for loan losses increased from $780 million to $2.3 billion,
and the aggregate stock prices of all REITs fell by more than twothirds. 20 Three of the ten largest REITs in 1974 subsequently
21
filed for bankruptcy.
14 BEIT FAcrBoox, 1977, supra note 1, at 12-14.
15 Id. 27.
16 Id.

28.

17 In 1968, total borrowings by BElTs from these sources stood at $90 million;
in 1973, borrowings had increased to over $10 billion. Id.
18 For an analysis of the principal high risk lending practices utilized by mortgage BElTs during this period of rapid expansion, see Drexel Burnham & Co., Bank
Loans to REITs: Problems and Prospects 29 (1975), reprinted in Real Estate
Investment Trusts: Hearings on S. 2721 before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
REIT Hearings]; Ostema, Back to Basics in Real Estate-Trusts Tried Innovations
That Served No One Well, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1974, § F, at 12, col. 1.
19 BElT FAcTBooK, 1977, supra note 1, at 28.
201d. 21 (National Ass'n of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NABE1T) Stock
Price Index, Jan. 1974-Dec. 1975).
21 Continental Mortgage Investors; First Mortgage Investors; Great American
Mortgage Investors.
Although a detailed analysis of the rise and fall of the BElT industry during
the past dozen or so years is beyond the scope of this Article, REIT literature contains a large number of articles on the subject. See, e.g., Benger, Banks" Dismay
Over PEITs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1974, § F, at 2, col. 1; Ostema supra note 18;
Robertson, How the Bankers Got Trapped in the REIT Disaster, FoRTUNE, March
1975, at 113; New Lows for the Once Mighty REITs, Bus. Wm, April 20, 1974,
at 82; REITs Face Shakeout as Investments Sour, Cash Sources Dry Up, Wall St. J.,"
Jan. 21, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
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It is the essential similarity of the REIT to the regulated investment company and the need to evaluate federal regulation of the
REIT along lines similar to those now imposed on regulated investment companies that is the focus of this Article. The Article will
examine three areas of regulatory concern common to REITs and
regulated investment companies: (1) conflicts of interest involving
transactions between such companies on the one hand and their
investment advisers and affiliates of such advisers on the other; (2)
negotiation of advisory contracts between such companies and their
investment advisers; and (3) regulation of excessive risk taking,
principally in the area of debt leverage. In each of these areas, the
Article will determine whether the Investment Company Act embodies a regulatory concern that also applies to the structure and
operation of REITs, and, if so, whether existing federal and state
laws adequately address that concern. The Article will further
consider the pros and cons of the regulatory approaches utilized by
with
the Investment Company Act in these areas and will conclude
22
a recommendation for a specific legislative approach in each.
II.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

A. Background

The Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Investment Company
Act") 23 was in large measure a legislative response to a widespread
variety of conflicts of interest and resulting abuses that had characterized the management and operation of the mutual fund industry; 24
22

these abuses were attributable in large part to the unique

The similarity between BElTs and regulated investment companies and the

need to regulate BElTs on a basis comparable to that under which investment com-

panies are regulated has been suggested, though not fully explored, by several

commentators. See, e.g., Kraut, REITs as Investment Companies-Advising the
Independent Trustee of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 3 RxAL EsTATE Issurs 43
(1978); Lynn, Real Estate Investment Trusts: Problems and Prospects, 31 FOIWHAM
L. Bmv. 73, 103-08 (1962); Rosenblat & Lybecker, Some Thoughts on the Federal
Securities Laws Regulating External Investment Management Arrangements and
the ALI Federal Securities Code Project, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 587, 681-85 (1976).
23 Ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to
80a-52 (1976).
24

Section 1(b) of the Investment Company Act itself recites this conclusion:
(b) Upon the basis of facts disclosed by the record and reports of the

Securities and Exchange Commission . . . it is hereby declared that the

national public interest and the interest of investors are adversely affected
(2) when investment companies are organized, operated, managed,

or their portfolio securities are selected, in the interest of directors, officers,
investment advisers, depositors, or other affiliated persons thereof, in the
interest of underwriters, brokers, or dealers, in the interest of special classes
of their security holders, or in the interest of other investment companies
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managerial structure of most mutual funds. Unlike the typical
corporation 25 a mutual fund consists almost solely of a portfolio of
liquid securities in which fund shareholders hold undivided fractional interests. The management of the portfolio and the fund's
business affairs typically is the responsibility of the investment adviser, an independent entity that is compensated for its services by
a fee that is usually based upon a percentage of the size of the
fund's portfolio. Although the interests of the fund and its adviser
are to some extent congruent, those interests may differ substantially
in important areas, including fund growth and size, capitalization
and leverage, portfolio transactions, management fees, and sales
charges. 26 It was these types of conflicts, among others, that Congress sought to minimize in passing the Investment Company Act.2 7
The management structure of the typical REIT is similar to
that of the mutual fund. The REIT itself is a mere shell, with a
portfolio consisting of real estate equity interests, mortgages, or
some combination thereof. 28 Management of the trust's business
affairs is typically vested in an external management company, which,
for compensation, performs duties that typically include location
and underwriting of real estate investments, periodic analysis of and
or persons engaged in other lines of business, rather than in the interest of
all classes of such companies' security holders ....
15 U.S.C. §80a-1(b)(2) (1976).
The legislative history of the Investment Company Act, including the SEC's
Investment Trust Study and the congressional hearings on the proposed bills, contain lengthy litanies describing instances of fund mismanagement by officers, directors, advisers, and affiliates whose interests were at odds with those of the funds
with which they dealt. Hearings on S. 3580 before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) [hereinafter cited
as Investment Company Act Hearings]; SECUnrMS & ExcHANcE ComnZMnsoN,
INVEsTMENT TRUSTS Am LrsTmENT CoMANIEs (1939) (in particular part Ill)
[hereinafter cited as INVESTMENT TRUST STUDY]. See generally L. Loss, supra note
9, at 149-50.
25The management of the typical corporation is entrusted to officers and
directors who are paid employees of the corporation itself and who often have a
substantial equity interest in the company. Presumably, the interests of management and shareholders in profit maximization are coextensive, thus minimizing actual
and potential conflicts of interest between the two groups. Tannenbaum v. Zeller,
552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. F. Eberstadt & Co. v. Tannenbaum, 434 U.S. 934 (1977).
26 For a particularly good analysis of the conflicts of interest that characterize
mutual fund management, see Note, The Relationship Between the Investment
Adviser and the Mutual Fund: Too Close for Comfort, 45 FoDHAM L. REv. 183
(1976). See also Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities
of Unafiliated Directorsof Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1058, 1059-60 (1967).
27 Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d at 406. See also Rosenfeld v. Black, 445
F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed sub nom. Lazard Fr6res & Co. v.
Rosenfeld, 409 U.S. 802 (1972).
28 See note 1 supra.
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recommendations with respect to portfolio holdings, and location
and maintenance of credit relationships with lending institutions. 29
As a result of this external management structure, many of the
same kinds of conflicts that are endemic to the investment company
and that Congress sought to regulate in the Investment Company
Act are present in the REIT. Hence, because the investment
adviser's compensation is frequently based on fund size, 30 the adviser
has an incentive to promote rapid growth when in fact such growth
may not be in the trust's best interest and may be achieved only by
underwriting investments of marginal quality. In addition, if the
adviser or any of its affiliates has the capability to provide services
that the REIT may require, the adviser's loyalties in recommending
its services or those of its affiliates vis-i-vis alternative sources similarly may be divided.31 Finally, though not least significantly,
when a REIT adviser is a subsidiary or affiliate of an institution
engaged in lending and real estate investment in areas in which the
REIT also invests, the adviser institution faces a substantial conflict of interest in deciding whether to recommend favorable invest32
ments to the REIT or to acquire them for its own account.
The foregoing conflicts are not merely hypothetical. Although
there have been no studies of conflicts of interest and concomitant
abuses in REITs similar to the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC," "Commission") Investment Trust Study, 33 available
data suggest that actual and potential conflicts of interest are not
uncommon in REITs. Hence, in four civil injunctive actions by
29 Although it is not necessary for REITs to have external management to

qualify for pass-through treatment under §§ 856-858 of the Internal Revenue Code,
most REITs still maintain this type of management arrangement. Hence, as of
the end of 1977, 150 REITs still utilized external management companies (a decrease from approximately 175 two years earlier), whereas a total of 40 trusts were

self-administered. BEIT FAcTBooK, 1977, supra note 1, at 13, 39.
30 See notes 157-59 infra & accompanying text.
31 This is particularly true of REITs sponsored by commercial banks.

As one

commentator observes:
The bank, through the advisory subsidiary, may direct the trust to

borrow funds from the bank when the BElT may have less expensive
financing options available. The bank may sell its trust various banking
services, such as those of a registrar or stock transfer agent, at higher
prices than are available elsewhere. If the BElT deposits are held by the
bank, then the advisor may maintain excessively high cash balances to the
benefit of the bank and to the detriment of the BElT. As part of the
tie-in business strategy, the bank may require that parties who do, business
with the BEIT must maintain deposits with the bank.
EIT HEAINGS, supra note 18, at 47 (statement of B. Neuberger).
32 Id.

46.

For two excellent discussions of conflicts of interest in BElT man-

agement generally, see id. 96-107 (statement of R. Schotland) and Duval, Conflict
of Interest Problems in the Management of REITs, 3 REAL ESTATE L.J. 23 (1974).
s3 See note 24 supra.
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the SEC involving REITs, 4 the Commission has alleged various
abuses by REIT advisory companies, including investments in
marginal loans for purposes of increasing advisory fees, concealment of performance data on trust investments for purposes of maintaining the level of the advisory fee, undisclosed maladministration
of trust loans by investment advisers, investments in assets not authorized by the applicable declaration of trust, and phony transactions with affiliated borrowers to increase the apparent fair market
value of REIT properties. In the only one of the four cases that
has been the subject of litigated findings of fact it was found, among
other things, that the defendant REIT, although ostensibly directed
by an independent outside adviser, was in reality operated by a
"'cabinet' of individuals who also operated a number of other
affiliated real estate companies. The court further found that certain of these individuals had structured a series of sham real estate
transactions designed to conceal losses from the REIT's shareholders
and to overstate earnings through generation of fictitious profits.35
Examination of prospectuses and periodic reports filed with
the SEC by publicly-held REITs further indicates that REITs
and their investment advisers are in habitual positions of conflicting interests. In 1977, all of the ten largest externally-managed
REITs were sponsored or advised by financial institutions (or subsidiaries thereof) that were engaged in real estate activities parallel
to those of the REIT and that were acknowledged to be in competition with the REIT for investment opportunities. 36 More significantly, each of the ten REITs disclosed the existence of trans34 SEC v. Citizens & Southern Realty Investors, Civ. No. 78-0711 (D.D.C.,
filed April 21, 1978); SEC v. Continental Advisers, Civ. No. 78-0066 (D.D.C.,
filed Jan. 16, 1978); SEC v. First Mortgage Investors, Civ. No. 75-1850-CIV-JE
(S.D. Fla., filed Sept 5, 1975); SEC v. Standard Life Corp., Civ. No. 75-0052-E
(W.D. Okla., filed July 2, 1975).
35 SECv. First Mortgage Investors, Civ. No. 75-1850-CIV-JB (S.D. Fla., filed
July 17, 1978).
3
6 See Appendix A. A typical disclosure of such conflict reads as follows:
Possible Conflicts of Interest. Real estate investment activities of [the
Adviser] will parallel those of the Trust in many types of its investments,
and therefore to a certain extent [the Adviser] will be engaged in competition with the Trust for available investment opportunities. While [the
Adviser] has agreed to use its best efforts to present to the Trust a continuing and suitable investment program consistent with the investment
policies and objectives of the Trust, [the Adviser] is not required to present to the Trust any particular investment opportunities which come to
[the Adviser], even if such opportunities are such that, if presented to the
Trust, could be taken by the Trust.
MONY Mortgage Investors, Prospectus dated April 14, 1970, at 3-4. See also
Cates & Harwell, Banks' Big Stakes in REIT Field, BxNmm's MoNrnLy, August
15, 1970, at 19, 45.
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actions between the REIT and the adviser or affiliates of the adviser
involving possibly substantial conflicts. These transactions included loans in which the REIT and the adviser had a joint
interest, 37 direct loans by the REIT to affiliated persons, 38 purchases
of real property by the REIT from affiliated persons, 39 service
contracts between the REIT and business entities owned in whole
or in part by the REIT's investment adviser or its affiliates, 40 and
purchases of REIT portfolio assets by investment advisers or their
affiliates in return for reductions of outstanding indebtedness to
41
the adviser.
B. Existing Safeguards
Superficially, the same types of legislative concerns that apply
to the external management structure of the mutual fund and resulting conflicts of interest have equally valid application to the
REIT. Whether those concerns justify federal regulation, how37 See Appendix A.
Of the 10 BEITs surveyed, all but one disclosed joint
loans in which the Trust and the Adviser (or the Adviser's parent) participated.
In most cases, the REIT's participation involved significant loan balances, including
$95.4 million in participations by MONY Mortgage Investors, $119.7 million by
Connecticut General Mortgage and Realty Investments, and $409 million by
Equitable Life Mortgage and Realty Investors. Id.
38 See Appendix A. Of the 10 largest BEITs surveyed, four disclosed transactions involving one or more of the following: (1) loans to entities in which
trustees of the trust or directors of the adviser had a direct interest; (2) issuance
of loan commitments on properties in which affliates of the advisory company had
an interest; and (3) loans to subsidiaries of the adviser or joint ventures in which
wholly-owned subsidiaries of the adviser had an interest.
39 One of the 10 REITs surveyed disclosed a purchase of developed property
from a wholly-owned subsidiary of the adviser's parent. Appendix A (Connecticut
General Mortgage and Realty Investments).
40
See Appendix B. Of the 10 largest externally-managed REITs in 1977, five
disclosed the amounts of compensation paid to the adviser or its affiliates for services not covered by the advisory contract. These typically included fees for servicing long-term mortgages received by the Trust, although fees were also received
for other services, including stock transfers, auditing, commercial paper endorsement, property management, underwriting of securities offerings, and registrar services. In some cases the additional fees were small, although in others they ran
into several million dollars. Id.
41 Three of the largest bank-sponsored BEITs have disclosed significant purchases of assets by the bank-sponsors from the REIT. See Chase Manhattan Mortgage and Realty Investors, Registration Statement on Form S-1 dated May 27,
1977, at 50; Citizens and Southern Realty Investors, Registration Statement on
Form S-11 dated April 28, 1978, at 73; Continental Illinois Realty, Annual Report
on Form 10-K dated June 23, 1977, at 45. For a discussion of REIT asset swaps
generally, see Nicholson, Problem Assets Still Plague Trusts Despite Swaps, 19
NAT'L REAL ESTATE INv STOR 21 (1977); Nicholson, Properties Selling for Inflated Prices in Asset Swaps, 18 NAT'L REAL ESTATE INvEsToR 18 (1976); Schorr
& Meyer, Realty Trusts Raise Cash, Repay Bankers by Giving Up Assets, Wall
St. J., Jan. 5, 1976, at 1, col. 6; Troubled REITs Swap Assets for Cash, Bus.
WEEK, July 21, 1975, at 68.
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ever, depends upon the adequacy of existing mechanisms designed
to insulate the REIT from possible abuses endemic to such conflicts. Broadly speaking, these mechanisms may be said to fall into
three categories: (a) restrictions imposed by the REIT itself; (b) restrictions imposed by state law; and (c) restrictions imposed by
federal law.
1. Self-Imposed Restrictions
Most REITs operate under advisory contracts or declarations
of trust that impose restrictions in situations in which the possibility
for self dealing is present. Hence, the declarations of trust under
which almost all externally-managed REITs operate stipulate that
all transactions between the REIT and its adviser or affiliates of the
adviser must be approved by a majority of trustees not affiliated with
the adviser or its affiliates.4 Almost all declarations further specify
that such transactions must be "fair and reasonable" to the shareholders of the trust and must embody terms no less advantageous to
the trust than terms obtainable in similar transactions consummated
at arms-length.43 A number of REITs and advisers have incorporated further provisions into the advisory contract that are designed
to ensure that an adviser who is originating loans for its own account
will also fairly allocate desirable investment opportunities to the
REIT. Under certain advisory contracts, the REIT may require
its adviser to participate as a co-lender on equal terms ("pari
passu") up to a fixed percentage of any loan recommended by the
adviser and extended by the trust, or may participate itself up to
a fixed percentage in loans extended by the adviser." A limited
number of REITs have also incorporated into the advisory contract
a "right of first refusal," giving the REIT the first option to acquire
allowable investments before the adviser may acquire such invest45
ments for its own account.
4 2

See Appendix A.

43 d.
44 Id. Of the 10 largest externally-managed REITs surveyed, five incorporated
pad passu provisions in their advisory contracts. Of the five, four provided for
participation by the adviser in loans recommended to the trust; the maximum participation required of the adviser in these cases was 15 percent One contract
allowed for participation by the trust in loans made by the adviser or its affiliates;
the maximum allowable participation thereunder was 10 percent Id.

4 Id. Of the 10 BElTs surveyed, only three incorporated such provisions in
their advisory contracts. Under one of the three contracts, moreover, although the
BElT could request that the adviser make any of its investment opportunities
available to the BElT, the adviser was not required to do so, in which case the
non-affiliated trustees' only recourse was cancellation of the advisory contract.
See Equitable Life Mortgage and Realty Investors, Prospectus dated Oct. 29,
1970, at 26.
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The foregoing protections, unfortunately, are only of limited
value. Although trustees are required to find, after full disclosure,
that transactions between the REIT and affiliated entities are "fair
and reasonable," the sanctions for failure to exercise due care in
making this determination are questionable at best. Almost all
REIT declarations of trust contain a broad exculpatory clause relieving the trustees as well as the adviser from liability for all but
intentional or "gross and reckless" acts; 46 under common law principles in many jurisdictions the validity of such provisions has been
upheld. 47 For reasons to be articulated, moreover, the common
law "duty of care," which arguably applies to REIT trustees charged
with detecting and preventing self-dealing managerial transactions,
is an inadequate protection absent the imposition of a meaningful
standard of liability upon such trustees.4 8
The "pari passu" and "first refusal" provisions are similarly
limited. Not all REIT advisory contracts incorporate such provisions.49 Some incorporate one and not the other; some incorporate
neither. The pari passu provision, when utilized, often requires
the adviser to participate only to a limited extent-in most cases as
little as ten percent-in the loans that it recommends to the REIT. 50
The right of first refusal is, in theory, a significant protection for
the REIT in that it ensures that the REIT will have "first crack"
at desirable investment opportunities that become available to the
adviser. As previously indicated,51 however, the use of first refusal
provisions is limited. Moreover, it is questionable whether in practice the REIT's nonaffiliated trustees can or should be expected to
scrutinize meaningfully every investment opportunity that becomes
available to the adviser on the "first refusal" basis, particularly
when the adviser originates or receives a large number of investment opportunities in the course of its operations.
2. Restrictions Imposed by State Law
In addition to self-imposed protections, statutory as well as
common law principles in most states contain restrictions that have
46 See Appendix A.

The typical exculpatory clause contains the following

restrictions: "No Trustee, officer or agent of the Trust is liable to the Trust or to a
shareholder except for his own bad faith, wilful misfeasance, gross negligence, or
reckless disregard of his duties." Continental Illinois Realty, Registration Statement on Form S-11 dated Dec. 20, 1972 (Amend. No. 1), at 37.
47 See G. BoGER, HANDBOOE OF THE LAw OF TRusTs § 94 (5th ed. 1973).
48 See notes 65-70 infra & accompanying text
49 See note 44 supra.
50

51

See Appendix A.
See note 45 supra.
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relevance to conflicts of interest in REIT management. A number
of existing state statutory regulations dealing with securities offerings by RETs 52 are patterned after the Statement of Policy regarding REITs ("Statement of Policy" "Policy") adopted by the
Midwest Securities Commissioners Association ("MSCA"). 53 Under
the provisions of the Statement of Policy, REIT offerings may be
deemed "unfair and inequitable" unless the REIT's organizational
instruments impose certain restrictions designed to minimize conflicts of interest and self-dealing in the management of the REIT.
Principally, these provisions require (1) that a majority of trustees
not be affiliated with the adviser of the trust or any affiliate
thereof; r- and (2) that trustees and officers of, and the adviser to
any trust may not sell to or purchase from the trust any assets
except in specified instances, and only then with the approval of a
majority of the independent trustees. 55
Although the foregoing limitations are unquestionably salutary
as far as they go, they have neither been widely accepted nor have
52 For a comprehensive discussion of state "blue sky" statutes and BEITs, see
Polubinski, The Effect of State Securities or Blue Sky Law Regulation Upon the
OrganizationalStructure and Operations of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 30 Bus.
LAWYER 179 (1974).
53 Id. 180-81.
54 Subsection A provides: "Trustees. A majority of the trustees shall not be
affiliated with the adviser of the trust or any organization affiliated with the adviser of the trust. The trustees shall be elected by the shareholders of the trust
annually." 1 BLUE SrY L. REP. (CCH) 114801.
55 Subsection B provides:
Self Dealing. No trustee, officer, or adviser of a trust, or any person
affiliated with any such persons, shall sell any property or assets to the
trust or purchase any property or assets from the trust, directly or indirectly, nor shall any such person receive any commission or other remuneration, directly or indirectly, in connection with the purchase or sale of trust
assets, except pursuant to transactions that are fair and reasonable to the
shareholders of the trust and that relate to:
1. the acquisition of property or assets at the formation of the trust
or shortly thereafter that is fully disclosed in the prospectus;
2. the acquisition by the trust of federally insured or guaranteed
mortgages at prices not exceeding the currently quoted prices at which
the Federal National Mortgage Association is purchasing comparable
mortgages;
3. the acquisition of other mortgages on terms not less favorable to
the trust than similar transactions involving unaffiliated parties; or
4. the acquisition by the trust of other property at prices not exceeding the fair value thereof as determined by independent appraisal.
All such transactions and all other transactions in which any such
persons have any direct or indirect interest shall be approved by a majority of the trustees, including a majority of the independent trustees. All
commissions or remuneration received by any such person in connection
with any such transactions shall be deducted from the advisory fee.
1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1r4801.
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they been sufficient to address all potential conflicts between REITs
and their advisers. Hence, as of this writing, only seven states 56
and the American Stock Exchange have enacted rules or regulations
modeled upon the MSCA Statement of Policy.57

Seven other

states 58 have adopted rules that deal specifically with REITs but
that are substantially more limited in scope than the MSCA Statement of Policy. Of the states that have formally adopted rules dealing with REITs, almost all exempt REIT offerings if the shares
are listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 59 Significantly, as of
August 1977, the shares of at least thirty-seven REITs, representing
over forty-one percent of total industry assets, qualified for this
exemption.6 0 Finally, the MSCA guidelines apply only to new
offerings of securities; they have no applicability when REITs
finance through commercial paper and bank lines of credit.
Apart from the limited application of the MSCA Statement of
Policy, the Policy itself ignores certain important conflict problems.
The provisions that address self-dealing are limited to situations
involving purchases and sales of assets between the trust and its in56
A.aska, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) g6046; Iowa, IA BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 1 18,642; Kansas, IA BLUE SKY L. REP. f 19,707; Missouri, 2 BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) 1128,651; Tennessee, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1145,626; Wis-

consin, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.

(CCH)

152,732; Wyoming, 3 BLUE SKY L. RE.

(CCH) ff 53,614.
57 Other states have informally aclmowledged adherence, in varying degrees,
to the MSCA Policy, but have not adopted rules or regulations incorporating the
Policy in whole or in part. See Polubinskd, supra note 52, at 198-201 (Table II).
58 States that have adopted -rules or regulations relating to the organization
and business activities of REITs include: California, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
If8598; Florida, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) If13,623; Idaho, 1A BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) f1115,701-15,713; Michigan, 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 11125,63825,652; Mississippi, IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1127,641; Washington, 3 BLUE
Of the foregoing states, California, Idaho and
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 150,607.
Washington have no regulations limiting self-dealing transactions between the
REIT and its trustees, investment adviser, or their respective affiliates.
Three states have adopted rules or regulations that only require certain disclosures in connection with BElT offerings but do not otherwise regulate organization or business activities thereof: New Jersey, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
1133,761; New York, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1135,611; Virginia, 3 BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) 111149,613, 49,615.
59 Of states adopting regulations applying to BElT offerings, 11 exempt shares
from their respective securities statutes if such shares are listed on the New York
Stock Exchange. ALASxA STAT. § 45.55.140(a) (10) (Supp. 1977); CAL. CoRP.
CODE § 25100(o) (West Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.05(6) (West 1972)
(repealed effective July 1, 1980 (West Supp. 1978)); IDAHo CODE § 30-1434(8)
(Supp. 1978); IowA CODE ANN. § 502.4(5) (West 1949); KAN. STAT. §17-1261(g)
(Supp. 1977); McH. STAT. ANN. § 19.776(402) (7) (1975 rev.); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§409.402(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §49-3-50(a)(8) (West
1970); TENN. CODE Amx. §48-1619(F) (1964); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 21.20.
310(8) (1978); WYo. STAT. §17-4-114(a)(vii) (1977). Mississippi, New York
and Wisconsin have no exempting legislation for shares listed on national securities exchanges.
60 REIT FAcTBooK, 1977, supra note 1, at 23.
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vestment adviser, trustees and officers, or any of their respective affiliates. Nowhere do the provisions address conflicts of interest inherent in the sale of services to the REIT by the investment adviser or
its affiliates, or conflicts that exist when an investment adviser or any
of its affiliates are engaged in business activities, including lending
and acquisition of real property, in which the REIT is also engaged."1 More significantly, the self-dealing provision relies upon
the diligence and good faith of the trust's independent trustees to
ascertain the fairness of transactions involving purchases and sales of
trust assets. In the absence of the imposition of stringent fiduciary
duties on the adviser and the independent trustees, this reliance may
2
be misplaced.
Prevailing common law standards also impose upon corporate
officers and directors certain duties that address the supervision of
managerial conflicts of interest. Hence, state law imposes upon all
corporate directors and, presumably upon trustees of business
trusts,

3

a general duty of care with respect to the conduct of cor-

61 Only Missouri has adopted a regulation that addresses this conflict situation:
(G) Reasonable safeguards to avoid conflicts of interest shall be established in the case of any adviser or person sponsoring a trust, or parent
or any affiliate of the adviser or person sponsoring the trust, who is engaged
or may engage in the type or kind of activities within the purposes of the
trust, or who is engaged or may engage in furnishing advisory services to
persons other than the trust, which advisory services are of the type or
kind of services furnished or to be furnished the trust.
2 BLUE S Y L. REP. (CCH) 1r28,651.
62 See text accompanying note 145 infra.
63 At least one commentator has questioned whether BEIT trustees would be
held to the ordinary standard of care imposed upon directors of corporations, or
B.
to the more stringent standards imposed upon trustees of an ordinary trust
LoPEz, THE RoLE OF = "INDEPENDENT" TRUS=E IN A BEIT 3-5 (1974).
Although no case appears to have dealt with the specific issue in the PEIT
context, a number of courts have noted that there are significant differences between the objectives and operations of an ordinary trust and those of a business
trust. Hence, it has been observed that an ordinary trust exists principally to hold
and conserve particular assets, whereas a business trust's primary purpose, like that
of a corporation, is to conduct a business for profit. E.g., Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 358-60 (1935); Bomeisler v. M. Jacobsen & Sons Trust, 118
F.2d 261, 265 (1st Cir), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 630 (1941); Brooklyn Trust Co.
v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 865, 867 (2d Cir. 1936). Indeed, in several cases the
business trust has been held to be a corporation for certain purposes, Morrissey v.
Commissioner, 344 U.S. at 358-60; Loring v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 781,
785 (D. Mass. 1948), and trustees have been held to be the equivalent of corporate directors, Ashworth v. Hagan Estates, 165 Va. 151, 155, 181 S.E. 381, 382
(1935).
Under the rationale of the foregoing cases, it seems doubtful that the standards of care imposed upon the trustees of ordinary trusts would be imposed upon
trustees of a business trust. Rather, it seems more probable, given the similarity
in function between corporate directors and trustees of a business trust, that trustees
of a business trust would be held to the same standard of care as corporate
directors. Cf. Saminsky v. Abbott, 40 Del. Ch. 528, 537, 185 A.2d 765, 771 (1961)
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porate affairs and the supervision of the conduct of corporate management. 64 The duty of care, unfortunately, is of questionable
prophylactic value. Significantly, it has been used to impose liability
on directors principally when the directors have been personally
involved in self-dealing by management 65 and when there has been
a demonstration of a resultant monetary loss to the corporation and
its shareholders.6 6 Almost all cases that have held directors liable
for mere negligent failure to detect managerial self-dealing have
involved banks and similar financial institutions; the cases suggest
that a lesser duty is required of directors of non-banking enterprises. 67 Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, directors may be held
liable only for gross negligence, suggesting that a director or trustee
cannot be found liable in the absence of actual knowledge of fraudulent self-dealing by managerial personnel.6 8 In this connection, it is
significant that Massachusetts law, which governs the liability of
70
many major REITs, 69 adopts the gross negligence standard.
(common law business trust partakes of most of the attributes of ordinary business corporation); State Street Trust Co. v. Hall, 311 Mass. 299, 302-03, 41 N.E.
2d 30, 33 (1942) (business trusts closely resemble corporations and frequently
have been considered as such); Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 332-33,
200 A.2d 398, 401 (1964) (discussing impracticality of applying standard of care
in ordinary trust situation to business and banking enterprises).
64
See generally 3A W. FLETCHE, CYCLOPEDIA OF =ms LAW OF PiUVATE
ComuonATONS § 1070, at 86-95 (rev. penn. ed. 1975).
65 According to one commentator who has surveyed the cases in the area:
The search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations have been
held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing
is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack.
Few are the cases in which the stockholders do not allege conflict of interest, still fewer those among them which achieve even such partial success
as denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint.
Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968) (footnote
omitted). Accord, W. FrTcHER, supra note 64, § 1070, at 87. See also Dyson,
The Director's Liability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341 (1965).
66
E.g., Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Hand, J.)
("The plaintiff must accept the burden of showing that the performance of the
[defendant director's] duties would have avoided loss, and what loss it would have
avoided.").
67 See, e.g., Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1938); Litwin v.
Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940). See generally W. CARY, CAsEs AND
MA.
rmrAs oN Cons'oRAmoNs, 525-27 (4th ed. 1969); W. FLETCHE, supra note
64, § 1068, at 84-85; Bishop, supra note 65, at 1095-99.
68W. FLETCHER, supra note 64, § 1034, at 24-26.
69 Of the ten largest externally-managed BElTs in the country in 1977, seven
were Massachusetts business trusts. See Appendix A.
70 Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 411, 8 N.E.2d 894,
904-05 (1937) ("clear and gross negligence"). See also Allied Freightways, Inc.
v. Cholfin, 325 Mass. 630, 633, 91 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1950) (director of business
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State law imposes on officers and directors of corporations a
correlative duty that is relevant to conflicts of interest in REITs:
the duty of loyalty. Although abstractions concerning the duty of
loyalty are of little value, it may be said generally that directors
and officers must exercise good faith in all transactions involving the
corporation and its property, and must demonstrate good faith and
inherent fairness in connection with all personal dealings with the
7 1

corporation.

Although the duty of loyalty imposed by common law appears
to provide a useful prophylactic in situations in which conflicts of
interest involve REIT officers, directors, and investment advisers,
such, unfortunately is not the case. As an initial matter, the duty
of loyalty applies principally to officers and directors directly employed by corporations; it is not clear whether it applies in all
instances to external investment advisers who manage a business
entity pursuant to an advisory contract.7 2 Second, although the
duty of loyalty requires a showing of fairness to the corporation on
the part of the officer or director who has dealt with it, 7 3 a number
corporation not liable for wrongful misconduct of others unless he joined with
them in perpetrating the wrong). The gross negligence standard has been severely
criticized. See N. Lrr, Tim LAw OF COnPOnArloNs § 78, at 274 (2d ed.
1971).
71 See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
See generally W.
FLETCHER,

supra note 64, § 850, at 175-81.

Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 663, 745 (1967)
(mutual fund advisers are not fiduciaries as to advisory fees) (comment of A.
Jaretzki, Jr.). But see Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971). In
Rosenfeld, the Second Circuit seemed to hold that an investment adviser to a
mutual fund stands in a fiduciary relationship to the fund and its shareholders
under common law principles, independently of the federal fiduciary standards
established under §36(a) of the Investment Company Act. Id. 1342-44. This
principle has been extended to the advisory relationship between a REIT and its
adviser in at least one instance involving an Internal Revenue Service ruling. Rev.
Rul. 74-471, 1974-2 I.R.B. 198 (corporation as agent is adviser subject to control
by trust and also is a trust fiduciary bound by fiduciary duty of loyalty).
73 See, e.g., Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 867 (3d Cir. 1968) (applying New
Jersey law); Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 169,
260 P.2d 823, 832 (1953) (citing California statute); Winchell v. Plywood Corp.,
324 Mass. 171, 176-77, 85 N.E.2d 313, 317 (1949). Professors Frey, Choper,
Leech, and Morris accurately summarize the status of the "'fairness"doctrine:
By mid-twentieth century, the rule became further liberalized. Despite the absence of any specific recent ruling on the issue in a number
of states, and despite occasional decisions that transactions were avoidable
by the corporation regardless of fairness if a majority of the directors had
an adverse interest or if an interested director was necessary for a
quorum, "it could be said with some assurance that the general rule was
that no transaction of a corporation with any or all of its directors was
automatically voidable at the suit of a shareholder, whether there was a
disinterested majority of the board or not; but that the courts would
review such a contract and subject it to rigid and careful scrutiny, and
72 Cf.
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of jurisdictions hold that a transaction will be presumed to be fair
if it is ratified by the shareholders or approved by a majority of
disinterested directors7 4 Indeed, with respect to contracts between
investment trusts and external management companies, when there
has been an express or implied ratification by shareholders the common law will not disturb such contracts absent a showing of corporate "waste"-a standard that is a far cry from the "fairness"
showing that is normally required under the duty of loyalty doctrine.7 5 As will be demonstrated below, the critical inadequacy of
the common law "fairness/waste" doctrine is its failure to provide
76
for an informed and effective decisionmaking process.
The duty of loyalty does not preclude corporate officers and
directors from entering into "good faith" competition with the
corporation; 77 thus, for example, no externally-imposed legal standard prohibits a REIT trustee from serving as president of a bank
that is active in the real estate loan market. "Good faith" competition is measured by the facts and circumstances of each case, 78 and
even failure to disclose the competing interest is not per se bad
faith.7 9 Although it would be unwise to prohibit completely competitive activity by REIT advisers and trustees, a mandatory disclosure requirement would allow the trustees to determine whether
such activity is in the best interest of the REIT.
3. Restrictions Imposed by Federal Law
The final source of existing regulation that is relevant to the
REIT conflict of interest problem is the general disclosure requirewould invalidate the contract if it was found to be unfair to the corporation."
A. FREY, J. CHoPFR, N. LEECH & C. Monms, CASES AND MATEPrALS MN ConPORATMNS 169 (2d ed. 1977) (footnotes omitted).
74 See, e.g., Lipkin v. Jacoby, 42 Del. Ch. 1, 202 A.2d 572 (1964); Saxe v.
Brady, 40 Del. Ch.474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962); Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg.
Co., 152 Minn. 460, 189 N.W. 586 (1922); Gallen v. National City Bank of New

York, 152 Misc. 679, 273 N.Y.S. 87 (1934).
75 See notes 174-77 infra & accompanying text. It was the apparent laxity
of the common law duty of loyalty and the application of the "corporate waste"
standard in assessing the fairness of mutual fund advisory contracts that prompted
Congress in 1970 to revise § 36 of the Investment Company Act. See note 203
infra.
76 See notes 116-36 supra & accompanying text.
77W.FLETcmER, supra note 64, at 187-93.
78 Id. 188.
79 See, e.g., Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d 327, 347, 49 Cal. Rptr.

App.
825, 840, 411 P.2d 921, 935-36 (1966); Patient Care Services v. Segal, 32 Ill.
3d 1021, 1031-32, 337 N.E.2d 471, 480 (1975).

See also Miller v. Miller, 301

Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d 71 (1974) (nondisclosure a factor in determining whether
a fiduciary has improperly usurped a corporate opportunity).
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("1933 Act") and the
ments under the Securities Act of 1933 110
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 81 ("1934 Act"), which apply with
equal force to corporate directors and REIT trustees.8 2 The relevant provisions include section 11 of the 1933 Act 83 (liabilities for
misstatements and omissions in documents offering securities for
sale), section 17 of the 1933 Act " (liabilities for misstatements and
omissions in connection with offers or sales of securities), section
10(b) of the 1934 Act I and rule lOb-5 thereunder 86 (liabilities for
misstatements and omissions in connection with purchases and sales
of securities), and section 14(a) of the 1934 Act 11 and rule 14a-9
thereunder 88 (liabilities for misstatements in connection with solicitation of proxies). In connection with the disclosure requirements
under each of these provisions, it is arguable that the trustees of a
REIT-particularly the independent trustees-have a statutory duty
to investigate and require disclosure of all instances of material
conflicts of interest and self-dealing involving the REIT-adviser
relationship.
Regrettably, the duty of investigation that attends the foregoing disclosure requirements is ambiguous at best and, at worst,
nonexistent. Under section 11, it appears that independent directors do have an affirmative duty to exercise due diligence in determining the fullness and accuracy of disclosure.8 9 However, the
duty only arises in connection with an issuer's offering documents;
it does not require subsequent disclosures by the corporation to its
public security holders.
Under section 10 and rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act, which apply
to all corporate disclosures whether made in connection with an
s0 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976).
slid. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
82 B. LoPEz, supra note 63, at 5.
8315

U.S.C. §77k (1976).

Id. § 77q.
85 Id. § 78j(b).
84

86 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
Rule 14a-3 prohibits solicitations that are
87 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
subject to the Act, unless proxy statements containing the information required by
Schedule 14A have been distributed to each person that is being solicited. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1977). Item 7 of Schedule 14A requires disclosure of the
interests of certain persons, including directors and officers, who engage in transactions with the issuer or its subsidiary. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1977).
88 17 C.F.L § 240.14a-9 (1977).
89 See generally Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200, 208
(1976) (dicta). In fact, § 11(b) of the 1933 Act specifically imposes upon directors a duty of "reasonable investigation." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (1976).
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initial offering or subsequent thereto,9 0 the courts have not been
receptive to the argument that failure of independent directors to
investigate is a sufficient predicate for liability. In the leading case,
Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,91 the Second Circuit reasoned that liability
under section 10 and rule lOb-5 in a private civil action may be
sustained only if the director-defendant may be shown to have acted
knowingly or in willful or reckless disregard of facts indicating
misstatements in information disseminated to investors. 92 The
Lanza standard is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,93 which interpreted the scienter requirement of section 10(b) in the context of shareholder actions.
Ostensibly, the Lanza standard would preclude the imposition of
liability upon a REIT's independent trustees for failure to discover and require disclosure of self-dealing by management absent
a showing that such trustee actually knew of the existence of such
self-dealing. 94
90

For purposes of § 10 and rule 10b-5, it is immaterial that a corporation is not

engaged in the offer, purchase, or sale of its securities at the time it issues a false or
misleading statement or report. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 839
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
91479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
92

The Lanza court contrasted the § 10 requirements with the "absolute liability
(except for the due diligence defense)" imposed by § 11 of the 1933 Act. Id.
1283. The court also noted that even in those § 10 cases in which courts had
endorsed a negligence standard, the conduct at issue had amounted to a violation
of a higher standard. Id. 1304.
93425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Hochfelder, the Court held that scienter must be
pleaded and proved in private actions under § 10 and rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act.
The Court stated in a footnote that it "need not address the question whether scienter
is a necessary element in an [SEC] action for injunctive relief under section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5." Id. 194 n.12. The Court also left undecided the issue whether reckless disregard is a sufficient predicate for civil liability under the antifraud section, although a number of post-Hochfelder decisions have so held. See, e.g., Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 795-96 (7th Cir. 1977); Franke v. Midwestern
Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (D. Okla. 1976); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F.
Supp. 1057, 1080-81 (D. Del. 1976); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp.
1226, 1242-43 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
94 At least two recently decided cases have applied the Lanza standard to the
conduct of independent trustees of a BEIT. Steinberg v. Carey, 439 F. Supp. 1233
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080, 1088
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). In Steinberg, the plaintiffs sued the nonaffiliated trustees of C.I.
Realty Investors, a hybrid BELT, for misstatements and omissions in a prospectus
issued by C.I. Realty in connection with a 1972 securities offering. In granting
summary judgment for three of the nonaffiliated trustees, the court found that plaintiffs had not demonstrated sufficient knowledge of the misstatements and omissions
to meet the standards in Lanza or Hochfelder. The result in Steinberg is strange in
that plaintiffs chose to base their action on § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act
rather than on § 11 of the 1933 Act. Under the latter section, of course, plaintiffs
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The case law interpreting the duty of inquiry imposed on independent directors under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act is in a state
of flux. Although section 17 and rule lOb-5 are worded almost
identically, the former section applies by its terms only to persons
who offer or sell securities; section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 apply to
sellers as well as purchasers. The post-Hochfelder courts that have
considered the question of the requisite standard of proof have
split on whether scienter is a necessary element of SEC enforcement actions under section 17(a). In one case brought by the SEC
that involved allegations of nondisclosure on the part of REIT
management, the court ruled that section 17(a), like section 10(b),
required a showing of actual intent to defraud. 5 Other courts
have held that mere negligence is a sufficient predicate for liability
under section 17(a) in injunctive actions brought by the SEC. 96
The final provisions of the federal securities laws that are
relevant to disclosures of conflicts of interest are sections 14(a) of
the 1934 Act 97 and rule 14a-9 thereunder.98 Broadly speaking,
these provisions proscribe, in terms similar to those used in section
10(b) and rule lOb-5, material misstatements in connection with
solicitation of shareholder proxies. Unlike section 10(b) and rule
10b-5, however, at least one circuit after Hochfelder has held that
scienter is not a necessary element of a cause of action under section 14(a) and rule 14a-9, and that mere negligent failure to comply with these provisions will suffice. 99 Unfortunately, the decision
did not go further to impose a broad duty of investigation upon
independent directors relative to conflicts of interest or self-dealing;
indeed, the court expressly based the liability of the defendant diwould not have been required to plead or prove scienter, and could have prevailed
by proving negligence.

In Gross, plaintiff shareholders, in a consolidated action, sued Diversified Mortgage Investors and various officers and trustees thereof, among others, principally
alleging violations of § 10 of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5. The court acknowledged the applicability of the Lanza scienter requirement, and held that plaintiffs
had sufficiently pleaded scienter, although it dismissed most of the complaint's sub-

stantive counts on other grounds.
95 SECv. American Realty Trust, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1171 (E.D. Va.
1977) (appeal pending). See also SEC v. Cenco, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193, 199-200
1977).
(N.D. Ill.
90 SEC v. Coven, 581 F. 2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. World Radio Mission,
Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 n.10 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v. Gceotek, 426 F. Supp. 715, 726
(N.D. Cal. 1976).
97 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976).
98 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1977).

99 Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
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rectors upon their approval of a proxy statement that misrepresented facts about which they had firsthand knowledge. 10°
Although the disclosure requirements of the 1933 and 1934
Acts operate as a valuable source of information about conflicts of
interest, and probably reduce the incentive to engage in such transactions, they offer insufficient protection against the acute problems presented by the REIT industry. The disclosure provisions
require very little of the trustees in terms of investigation and nothing with respect to consideration of alternatives to the proposed
conflict of interest transaction. In an industry that is characterized
by massive conflict of interest problems, after the fact disclosure,
even when coupled with the threat of suit by shareholders or the
SEC, is no substitute for informed decisionmaking by independent
trustees.
C. The Investment Company Act-Approaches to Conflicts
of Interest
In the Investment Company Act, Congress sought to minimize abuses arising from managerial conflicts of interest (1) by
placing outright prohibitions or restrictions on specified classes of
transactions between investment companies and certain affiliated entities; and (2) by imposing general fiduciary obligations on specified
classes of persons, including the nonaffiliated or "disinterested" directors of regulated investment trusts. Both provisions are instructive in terms of possible legislative approaches to the conflict of
interest problems present in the REIT.
The prohibitions on transactions involving investment companies and various classes of individuals whose interests may conflict
with those of the company are found principally in section 17 of the
Act. 10 1 Broadly speaking, section 17 was designed to prevent over100 Id. At least two district courts since Gould have also applied a negligence
standard in connection with alleged violations of the proxy provisions of the 1934
Act. In re Clinton Oil Securities Litigation, [1977-78] FD. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
1 96.015 (D. Kan. 1977); Billet v. Storage Technology Corp., 72 F.R.D. 583, 585
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
101 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1976).

The Investment Company Act contains a number of other prohibitions on specific
transactions designed in whole or in part to minimize conflicts of interests. These
include: § 10(f) (prohibitions relating to the purchase or acquisition of securities in
offerings involving certain affiated underwriters); § 12(b) (prohibitions on an openend fund underwriting its own shares); § 12(d) (limitations on ownership by investment companies of shares in other investment or insurance companies, brokerdealers, underwriters, or investment advisers); and § 23 (prohibitions relating to
distributions and repurchase of securities by closed-end companies). Because these
sections have little applicability to the operations of BElTs, they will not be considered here.
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reaching by all persons who might influence the management of the
investment company in connection with transactions that could be
used to benefit such individuals personally. 10 2 This group of persons
includes all "affiliates" of regulated investment companies, a broad
class of individuals and companies who may have direct or indirect
control relationships with the investment company. 103
Section 17 and the rules thereunder prohibit four types of
affiliated transactions: (1) transactions involving purchases and sales
of assets between investment companies and affiliates, promoters,
or underwriters thereof; 104 (2) extensions of credit by investment
companies to certain affiliated persons; 305 (3) transactions in which
an investment company and an affiliate or principal underwriter are
joint or joint and several participants; 106 and (4) receipt of com102 See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 53 (1977);
United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98, 108 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1019 (1972); Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Investment Company Act Release
No. 5128 (Oct. 13, 1967).
103 Under § 2(a) (3) of the Act, an "affiliated person" of another person includes
the following:
(A) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with
power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of
such other person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or
held with power to vote, by such other person; (C) any person directly or
indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, such
other person; (D) any officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of
such other person; (E) if such other person is an investment company, any
investment adviser thereof or any member of an advisory board thereof;
and (F) if such other person is an unincorporated investment company
not having a board of directors, the depositor thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (3) (1976). In addition to prohibitions on transactions between investment companies and affiliates, certain provisions of § 17 also prohibit
transactions between investment companies and principal underwriters (§§ 17(a) &
(d)) and promoters (§ 17(a)).
104 Section 17(a)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-17(a)(1)-(2) (1976).
105Section 17(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. §80a-17(a)(3) (1976). Section 17(a)(3)
allows borrowing of money or other property pursuant to § 21(b). The latter provision prohibits loans to controlling persons or persons under common control with
the investment company, but exempts from the prohibition the extension or renewal
of a loan made prior to the effective date of the Act and any loan to a company
owning all the outstanding securities of the lender. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-21(b) (1976).
106 Section 17(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1976), and rule 17d-1 thereunder,
17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1 (1977).
The terms "joint" and "joint and several" are not defined in the Act and have
been the subject of only limited judicial construction. See, e.g., SEC v. Talley Industries, Inc., 399 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. General Tire
Corp. v. SEC, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969). In view of the ostensible purpose of § 17,
however, it is reasonable to conclude that the terms contemplate any transaction by
an affiliate or principal underwriter in which the investment company must also take
some action with its assets. This would not only include the obvious case involving
direct transactions between the investment company and an affiliate, but also situations in which the investment company and its affiliate agree to purchase or sell
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pensation by affiliates acting as agents for the purchase or sale of
property to or for an investment company other than in the course
of such person's business as an underwriter or broker, and, in the
case of brokers, receipt of compensation in connection with purchases and sales of securities in excess of defined amounts. 10 7 The
SEC may, pursuant to an application, exempt proposed transactions
falling within the prohibitions of either sections 17(a) or 17(d) and
rule 17d-1 upon the making of findings designed to ensure the essential fairness of the proposed transaction to the investment company
08
and its shareholders.1
The second principal mechanism utilized by the Investment
Company Act to regulate conflicts of interest is found in sections
10(a) 109 and 36(a) 110 of the Act. Under section 10(a), registered
investment companies are required to have a board of directors
comprised of persons no more than sixty percent of whom are "interested persons" with respect to such company; section 2(a)(19) 111
of the Act defines "interested persons" to include, inter alia, six
classes of persons with respect to investment companies, including
affiliates of such companies, members of the immediate families of
affiliates, legal counsel, and certain "interested persons" of the comshares in another company. See id.; SEC v. Midwest Technical Development Corp.
[1961-64 Transfer Binder] FED. Szc. L. REP. (CCH) 91,252, at 94,154 (D. Minn.
1963).
107Section 17(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e) (1976). See generally United States
v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972).
08
sThe findings required to qualify for an exemption for a transaction covered
by § 17(a) are stated in § 17(b):
(1) the terms of the proposed transaction, ineiting the consideration
to be paid or received, [must be] reasonable and fair and . . .not involve
overreaching on the part of any person concerned;
(2) the proposed transaction [must be] consistent with the policy of
each registered investment company concerned, as recited in its registration
statement and reports filed under this Subchapter; and
(3) the proposed transaction [must be] consistent with the general
purposes of this Subchapter.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(b) (1976).
Rule 17d-l(b) provides:
In passing upon such applications [for exemption from § 17(d)
and rule 17d-1], the Commission will consider whether the participation of
such registered or controlled company in such joint enterprise, joint arrangement or profit-sharing plan on the basis proposed is consistent with
the provisions, policies and purposes of the act and the extent to which
such participation is on a basis different from or less advantageous than
that of other participants.
17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1 (b) (1977).
109 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1976).
110 Id. § 80a-36(a).
11Id. § 80a-2(a)(19).

r
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pany's investment adviser or principal underwriter. Section 36(a) 112
broadly proscribes "breaches of fiduciary duty involving personal
misconduct" by any officer, director, or investment adviser of any
regulated investment company, and vests in the SEC jurisdiction
to seek to enjoin such breaches. 113 A number of courts that have
considered the issue have also found an implied private cause of
action under section 36(a).114
Although superficially unrelated, sections 10(a) and 36(a) together represent an integrated approach to insulating regulated investment companies from managerial conflicts of interest. In section
10(a), Congress sought to create a class of directors whose interests
are completely independent of the interests of management and
management's affiliates; it was contemplated that those directors
would perform a "watchdog" function with respect to the activities
of interested directors and management, especially when those activities represented potential conflicts with the interests of the
fund.115 The fiduciary provisions of section 36(a), in turn, have
been interpreted to effectuate the watchdog function of the disinterested directors by imposing stringent disclosure requirements
112 Id.

§ 80a-36(a).

Section 36(a) provides, in relevant part:
The [Securities and Exchange] Commission is authorized to bring an
action . . . alleging that a person serving or acting in one or more of the
following capacities has engaged within five years of the commencement
of the action or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a
breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct in respect of any
registered investment company for which such person so serves or acts(1) as officer, director, member of any advisory board, investment adviser, or depositor; or
(2) as principal underwriter, if such registered company is an
open-end company, unit investment trust, or face-amount certificate
company.
If such allegations are established, the court may enjoin such persons
from acting in any or all such capacities either permanently or temporarily
and award such injunctive or other relief against such person as may be
reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances, having due regard to the
protection of investors and to the effectuation of the policies declared in
section 1(b) of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-36(a) (1976).
114 See, e.g., Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 373 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Johnson v. Moses, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 103
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1968); Tanzer v. Huffines, 314 F. Supp.
189, 193 (D. Del. 1970); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 221 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd,
294 F.2d 415 (2nd Cir. 1961). But see Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d
901, 912 (8th Cir. 1961); Monheit v. Carter, 376 F. Supp. 334, 342 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). See generally Crane & Walker, Who can Sue and Be Sued Under Section
36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 32 Bus. LAwYER 417 (1977) (espousing view that private parties have no implied cause of action under § 36(a)).
115 See Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 376-81 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Johnson v. Moses, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).
113
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upon fund management with respect to all transactions involving
possible conflicts of interest and by requiring that disinterested directors affirmatively consider and weigh all relevant factors and alternatives before passing upon such transactions. 116
The duties imposed by sections 10(a) and 36(a) are significant
in comparison with those imposed by common law fiduciary standards. Ostensibly, section 86(a) places upon persons affiliated with
a regulated investment company the fiduciary responsibility to act
in a manner that is fair to and consistent with the best interests of
the fund and its shareholders. To this extent, it is similar to and
effectively incorporates previously-discussed common law standards
governing self-dealing by corporate management. 117 Sections 10(a)
and 36(a) go substantially further than the common law, however, in
two significant respects.
First, section 86(a) requires that in all instances in which there
is a possible conflict of interest, all relevant facts be disclosed by
management to the disinterested directors. In Moses v. Burgin,
the seminal case involving interpretation of an investment adviser's
duty of disclosure under section 36(a), the court stated:
Whatever may be the duty of disclosure owed to ordinary
corporate directors, we think the conclusion unavoidable
that Management defendants were under a duty of full disclosure of information to these unaffiliated directors in
every area where there was even a possible conflict of interest between their interests and the interests of the
fund. 118
The imposition of a duty of disclosure on investment advisers
whose interests conflict with those of the funds that they manage
does not in itself improve upon common law standards. In general, the "fairness" doctrine 119 requires disclosure of conflicts of
interest by officers and directors, 120 and shareholder ratification only
116 Id. 376.
117 See text accompanying notes 70-75 supra. In Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552
F.2d 402, 416 n.20 (2d Cir. 1977), the court noted that the fiduciary standards
under § 36 are at least as stringent as those of the common law. See also Galfand

v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943
(1978) (Congress intended that conduct under § 36(b) be governed by traditional
rule of undivided loyalty); Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1344-45 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. dismissed sub nom. Lazard Fr&res & Co. v. Rosenfeld, 409 U.S. 802

(1972).
118 Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 376 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. Moses, 404 U.S. 994 (1971) (emphasis added).
119 See text accompanying notes 70-76 supra.
120one commentator has summarized the disclosure requirement as follows:

"If the interested fiduciary makes full disclosure to the board of directors, and the
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results in application of the "waste" standard 1 21 when it is accompanied by full disclosure. 122 The significance of the section 36(a)
duty lies in its attempt to ensure that the disinterested directors will
possess sufficient information to exercise the watchdog function
imposed upon them by Congress.
The Moses court emphasized the breadth of the duty of disclosure that is imposed by section 36(a). The court's broad construction of the disclosure requirement was unambiguous:
This duty [of disclosure] could not be put more clearly
than was stated by the SEC in 1965.
"The Investment Company Act's requirement as
to unaffiliated directors, if its purposes are not to be
subverted, carries with it the obligation on the part of
the affiliated directors, and the investment adviser
itself, to insure that unaffiliated directors are furnished
with sufficient information so as to enable them to participate effectively in the management of the investment company."
Except where it may be fairly assumed that every unaffiliated director will have such knowledge, effective communication is called for. And, in testing that assumption,
it must be borne in mind that they are not full time employees of the fund and it may be . . . that neither their
activities nor their experience are primarily connected
with the special and often technical problems of fund
1 23
operation.
transaction is authorized by the board, on the basis of the required quorum and vote,
the transaction usually would be properly authorized but with the burden of sustaining the transaction possibly on its proponents." H. HENN, HANDBOOE: oF Th LAW
OF Conron AoNs AND OHER Busiess ENrnmpmszs 466 (2d ed. 1970) (footnote
omitted). See State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 2d
375, 391 P.2d 979 (1964) (director's failure to disclose his position as officer and
substantial shareholder in another corporation rendered voidable a contract between
the two corporations; without disclosure the transaction was "unfair" per se).
121 See text accompanying notes 74 & 75 supra.
122Professor Henn states: "Obviously, shareholder ratification, to have any
effect, presupposes full disclosure to the shareholders in solicitating their notes or
proxies." H. HENN, supra note 120, at 469-70 (citing Heilbrunn v. Sun Chemical
Corp., 37 Del. Ch. 552, 146 A.2d 757 (Ch. 1958), af'd, 38 Del. Ch. 321, 150 A.2d
755 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 NJ. Super. 431, 92 A.2d
862 (1952), af'd mem., 12 N.J. 467, 97 A.2d 437 (1953); Berendt v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 108 N.J. Eq. 148, 154 A. 321 (1931)).
123 Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 376-77 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Johnson v. Moses, 404 U.S. 994 (1971) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). One
commentator has described the Moses standard of disclosure as follows: "The disclosure demanded is that necessary to enable the disinterested directors to exercise
independent judgment as to fund policies that are possibly touched by management
self interest.... Thus the standard... is a pragmatic one-whether management
has provided sufficient information to assure 'effective participation' of the inde-
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The court in Tannenbaum v. Zellerl2 A endorsed the broad view
of Moses, stating that management is required to provide not
only "full," but also "effective" disclosure to the independent directors. 125 In summary, Moses and Tannenbaum, require that
management provide the quantum of information that will allow
effective oversight by the independent directors.
Although the content of the state law duty varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,126 it appears that no state requires disclosure
of the magnitude contemplated by section 36(a). Many states simply require that the officer or director disclose the interest that conflicts with that of the corporation.-2 7 Several states go further and
require disclosure of the fiduciary's interest and the material facts
concerning the transaction at issue. 1 28 The fact that the bare "disclosure of interest" standard is the law in numerous states would
in itself justify the imposition of a stringent federal standard. However, even the more demanding "disclosure of facts about the transaction" standard does not equal the Moses requirement. As the
Tannenbaum court noted, section 36(a) mandates disclosure of more
than information about the conflict of interest transaction; at a
minimum, the management must inform the independent directors
of possible alternatives to its proposed action. 129 Moreover, there
is no indication that the broader version of the state law duty to disclose requires that management communicate technical information
in an understandable fashion; such communication is implicitly (or
explicitly) 130 contemplated in the Moses "effective participation"
criterion.
The second significant difference between common law fiduciary principles and those of sections 10(b) and 36(a) relates to the
pendent directors." Comment, Mutual Funds and Independent Directors:Can Moses
Lead to Better Business Judgment?, 1972 DuxE L.J. 429, 455.
124 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1977).
125 Id. 427.
128

For some representative statutory provisions that regulate conflict of interest

transactions see A. Fnsy, J. CHoPER, N. LEEcH & C. MoRmRs, supra note 73, at
172-76. Two commentators list 27 states that have enacted such statutes. Bulbulia
& Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down
of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NoTn DAum LAw. 201 (1977). For a brief discussion
of the development and status of the applicable common law rules, see A. FaEy, J.
CHOPEI,, N. LEc & C. Momurs, supra note 73, at 168-69.
127 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 713 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
128 See, e.g., DEr.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1975).
129 The court stated: "[W]e conclude that the second prong of the applicable
test-that the independent directors were fully informed by the adviser and the
interested directors of the possibility of recapture and the alternative uses of brokerage-has been met." 552 F.2d 402, 427 (2d Cir. 1977) (emphasis added).
230 See text accompanying notes 122 & 123 supra.
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duties of the disinterested directors. As previously discussed, 31 the
common law duty of care ostensibly requires little of outside directors in ferreting out self-dealing by inside directors and management
personnel. In many jurisdictions, it is necessary to demonstrate
complicity on the part of the outside directors, or, at the least,
actual knowledge of managerial self-dealing, to sustain liability.132
Under sections 10(a) and 36(a), however, the legislative history
makes it clear that directors may be liable for breaches of fiduciary
duty arising from nonfeasance (i.e., negligent failure to discover
self-dealing) as well as misfeasance. 133 More significantly, judicial interpretations of the Investment Company Act have set forth standards
indicating an affirmative duty on the part of disinterested directors
to consider diligently all factors relevant to an evaluation of managerial issues involving conflicts between fund and management
interests. In Fogel v. Chestnutt,134 a case involving management's
duty to disclose to the disinterested directors the possibility of taking certain actions to recapture brokerage commissions, the court
stated:
Congress had mandated independent directors in order "to
supply an independent check on management and to provide a means for the representation of shareholder interests
in investment company affairs. .

.

. The minimum re-

quirement to enable the Fund's independent directors to
discharge these duties ...

was a careful investigation of the

possibilities performed with an eye eager to discern them
rather than shut against them, and, if these possibilities
were found to be real, a weighing of their legal difficulties
and economic pros and cons. 135
131

See notes 65-70 supra & accompanying text.

132 Id.

133 In connection with the 1970 amendments to § 36, the House of Representatives Committee report declared:
[Y]our committee does not intend to limit the Commission under this
section to situations where an actual intent to violate the law can be shown
or acts of affirmative misconduct. In appropriate cases, nonfeasance of
duty or abdication of responsibility would constitute a breach of fiduciary
duty involving personal misconduct.

H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970). See also S.REP. No. 184,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1969).
134 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976).
335Id.
749-50 (citations omitted). See also Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d
402, 419 n.24 (1977) (citing Moses and Fogel as creating a dual test that requires
both adequate disclosure and exercise of judgment by the unaffiliated directors).

In Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 1961) (en banc), the Second
Circuit held that § 15(c) of the Investment Company Act creates a private cause of
action against mutual fund directors who approve an advisory contract without any
consideration of the merits of the contract or the services provided thereunder.
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Although the parameters of the Fogel duty are uncertain at this
point, its requirements of "careful investigation" and affirmative
"weighing" of the available alternatives provide basic safeguards
that are lacking in the nebulous "duty of care." 136
Can legislation seeking to neutralize conflicts of interest and
self-dealing between REITs and REIT management profitably adopt
the approaches of sections 10(a) and 36(a) of the Investment Company Act? At a minimum, it is clear that the fiduciary principles
embodied in section 36(a) represent a vast improvement over legal
duties imposed on REIT trustees and advisers under existing state
and federal laws. In essence, section 36(a) places upon management
the onus of full and effective disclosure in every area involving
possible conflicts of interest between the fund and management.
Perhaps more significantly, section 36(a) imposes upon the fund
director an affirmative duty to seek out and evaluate all facts germane to transactions containing possible elements of self-dealing,
thus exposing him to the risk of personal liability for breach of
fiduciary duty. In both respects, the fiduciary principles embodied
in section 36(a) demand, with respect to corporate management, a
degree of disclosure and informed scrutiny not found under common
law principles or the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws.
The advisability of imposing section 17-type prohibitions, subject to SEC review and approval, on a broad range of affiliated transactions between a REIT and management (or management affiliates)
is less clear. It may be expected that application to REITs of a
provision similar to section 17 of the Investment Company Act
would serve to lessen the possibility of overreaching in several ways.
First, the expense and time involved in the application to the Commission for the issuance of an exemptive order would alone discourage many types of transactions, particularly smaller ones, which fall
within the class of proscribed activities. Second, affiliates seeking
approval for such transactions would presumably take pains to do
so on terms that were fair to the REIT and its shareholders in order
to obtain the approval of the Commission. Third, the Commission
would have an opportunity to scrutinize the transaction and entertain opposing views, after which it could refuse an exemptive order
if overreaching or unfairness tainted the transaction.
These procedures, however, are not without disadvantages.
The application procedures under sections 17(b) and (d) and rule
136 For a discussion of the weaknesses of the law concerning the director's duty
of care, see notes 62-70 supra & accompanying text.
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17d-1 can be cumbersome and costly 137 and could well discourage

numerous REIT-adviser/affiliate transactions that otherwise would
prove to be mutually advantageous. This undesirable effect would
be particularly pronounced if the REIT required a large number
of services which, on a transaction-by-transaction basis, involve only
modest compensation to the affiliate; such services might include
property management, loan servicing, stock transfers, transfers of
real property, and commercial banking. In such cases, the adviser
(which already has these capabilities) might be willing to provide
such services to the REIT on a more economical basis than otherwise possible but for the cost and delay associated with a formal
administrative application.
More importantly, it is not clear that the SEC can or should
assume the burden of assessing the fairness of transactions involving
REITs and their affiliates. The application to REITs of a provision similar to section 17 would require the Commission to pass
on a variety of heretofore commonplace affiliated transactions involving REITs, including joint participations in mortgage loans and
equity investments, loans by REITs to affiliates, and, in the case of
REITs sponsored by lending institutions, swaps of assets by the
REIT with the sponsoring institution in return for reductions of
outstanding indebtedness. 138 Given the magnitude of the task as
well as the SEC's already substantial review responsibilities under
the Investment Company Act, the imposition of statutory fiduciary
responsibilities with concomitant public and private civil remedies
may serve as a more practicable and effective means of adequately
protecting shareholders than the SEC oversight mechanism embodied in section 17.
D. Recommendation
On balance, this author feels that legislation addressed to the
problem of conflicts of interest in REITs should rely principally
on the plenary review and approval of affiliated transactions by nonaffiliated trustees subject to a statutory fiduciary standard, and should
not resort to SEC administrative application procedures. Specifically, the recommended statutory provision should accomplish four
objectives.
37

' See Rosenblat & Lybecker, supra note 22, at 639. Under current Commission rules, notices of applications for exemptive orders under §§ 17(b) and (d)
and rule 17d-1 are published in the Federal Register. An application may be set
down for hearing at the request of an interested party or on the Commission's own
motion. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.0-2 and 270.0-5 (1977).
138 See notes 37-41 supra & accompanying text.
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First, it should, like section 10(a) of the Investment Company
Act, require a board of trustees comprised of a minimum number of
"independent" trustees who have no economic interests that might
conflict with those of the trust. 39 Such a provision should, at a
minimum, disqualify as an independent trustee all classes of persons
defined as "interested persons" by section 2(a)(19) of the Investment
Company Act, including affiliates of the REIT,140 members of the
immediate families of natural persons who are affiliates of the REIT,
interested persons of the investment adviser or principal underwriter
of the REIT, registered broker-dealers, and all other persons determined by the Commission to a have a "material business or professional relationship" with the REIT.
Second, the recommended provision should define all classes
of transactions involving possible conflicts of interest between the
REIT and its investment adviser or persons with an economic interest in the adviser. Such a provision should incorporate the
classes of "affiliated" transactions set forth in sections 17(a) and (d)
and rule 17d-l of the Investment Company Act, including all purchases of assets from or sales of assets to a REIT by any affiliated
person, and all transactions in which a REIT and any affiliated person thereof qualified as "joint" or "joint and several" participants. 14'
Third, the recommended provision should impose on the
REIT's investment adviser, including the adviser's officers and directors, a fiduciary duty that requires, at a minimum, disclosure of
all factors necessary to determine whether any affiliated transaction, as defined, is in the best interest of the REIT, and is on terms
that are fair and reasonable given the terms that would have
been obtained in an arms-length transaction. This standard gives
content to the "duty of full disclosure" required by the court
in Moses v. Burgin.142 The provision should also impose on the
REIT's trustees a correlative fiduciary duty that requires affirmative consideration by the trustees of all factors relevant to such a
determination, and should require a written record that sets out
139 See note 111 supra & accompanying text.

140 See note 103 supra. Under the Investment Company Act definition, "affiliated persons" of the REIT would principally include: (1) the adviser; (2) officers,
directors, employees, and partners of the adviser; (3) any parent of the adviser, including banking institutions, insurance companies, or real estate companies who

sponsored the BElT and the adviser; (4) all officers, directors, or employees of the
adviser's parent; (5) any subsidiary or other entity under the control of the adviser
or its parent; and (6) all officers, directors, and employees of such subsidiaries or
controlled entities. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (3) (1976).
141 See notes 104 & 106 supra & accompanying text.

142 See note 114 supra.
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the factors considered, the weight accorded to each, and the views
of the independent trustees. The provision should further require
the filing of a quarterly report with the SEC that details the terms
of any consummated transaction with an affiliate and includes the
trustees' report.1 4s Taken as a whole, the disclosure, affirmative
consideration, and filing requirements ensure that the independent
trustees will possess the ability and incentive to protect the interests of the investors.
Finally, the proposed legislation should create (a) enforcement
jurisdiction in the SEC to seek injunctive relief against management as well as the REIT's trustees for failure to discharge their
respective statutory duties, and (b) parallel private civil causes of
action for damages and equitable relief. The provision should
specify that negligent as well as willful derelictions of the statutory
duties would provide a predicate for suit, and should allow monetary recovery by shareholders for breaches of fiduciary duties,
144
irrespective of whether the fiduciary profited as a result thereof.
143 A similar proposal has been advanced by two commentators with respect to
proposed revisions of § 17 of the Investment Company Act. See Rosenblat &
Lybecker, supra note 22, at 634-45. Under that proposal, a three-tier scheme would
be established for all transactions now covered by §§ 17(b) and (d). The first tier
would involve de minimis service contracts between an investment company and
affiliated persons; such contracts would require no approval by directors or the SEC
if provided at the lesser of cost or market price. The second tier would involve
larger transactions that the disinterested directors found fair and reasonable, subject
to the fiduciary provisions of § 36(a). Third tier transactions would encompass all
affiliated transactions that the disinterested trustees were unable or unwilling to find
to be fair and reasonable. Such transactions would then be the subject of the formal
application procedures that now exist under §§ 17(b) and (d).
The author agrees with the foregoing approach in that it places on the independent directors rather than the SEC principal responsibility for determining the
fairness of a proposed affiliated transaction. Nevertheless, if the directors were
unable or unwilling to approve such a transaction, giving the SEC power to make
such a determination pursuant to formal application would constitute an unreasonable incursion by government into corporate governance. If directors of a mutual
fund (or the independent trustee of a REIT) decide not to approve an affiliated
transaction, they have exercised the type of oversight function contemplated by the
Investment Company Act and embodied in the proposed legislation advocated herein.
144 One of the principal failings of § 36 as now worded is its ambiguity with
respect to the existence of private causes of action by fund shareholders against the
fund's officers, directors, and investment adviser. Under § 36(b) of the Investment
Company Act, shareholders of registered investment companies may recover only
from persons who receive compensation under advisory contracts as a result of
breaches of fiduciary duties in connection with the approval of advisory contracts.
It is uncertain whether shareholders may also recover under § 36(a) for trustee
breaches of fiduciary duty that do not involve receipt of compensation under advisory contracts. See note 114 supra & accompanying text. If the directors or
trustees of a mutual fund or a BElT are to have adequate incentive to discharge
their fiduciary functions, however, shareholders of a BEIT should be able to recover
for breaches of fiduciary trust, whether or not the loss results from approval of an
advisory contract and whether or not the fiduciary profited as a result of its illegal
conduct. See notes 209-12 infra & accompanying text.
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A fundamental assumption of this legislative approach is that
a REIT's independent trustees are capable of exercising meaningful
vigilance over the enumerated transactions. Significantly, studies of
the role of independent directors of mutual funds, whose functions
are virtually identical to those of the independent trustees of
REITs, have concluded that these directors do not perform their
duties with either independence or diligence. Among other things,
it has been observed that independent directors of mutual funds
are generally chosen by the adviser or the affiliated directors, have
no staffs of their own, typically have other businesses and occupations, and receive only modest compensation. 145 However, these
studies do not take into account the effect of the 1970 amendments
to the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act
that disqualify individuals with family or material business relationships with the adviser from serving as independent directors, 146
nor do they take account of the more stringent fiduciary standards
incorporated in the Act pursuant to these amendments. 47 More
importantly, the studies focus on the overall relationship between
the independent director and the adviser; their conclusions about
that relationship are not validly generalizable to the independent
trustee's role envisioned by this proposal. If such legislation were
enacted, the adviser and the independent trustee would be on
notice that their conduct with respect to disclosure, investigation,
and consideration of the merits and alternatives of the enumerated
conflict of interest transactions would be measured by stringent
fiduciary standards. The sanction of personal liability for failure
145 Hearings before the Subcomm. *on Commerce and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 855-58 (1969)
(testimony of H. Budge) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Mutual Fund Amendment Hearings]; SEcumrns m EXCHANGE COmm'N, Putic PoLicy ImLICATIONS OF INVESTmENT COMPANY GROwTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 130-31 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as PUtuc PoXIcY IM UCATIONS]; WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANcE
AND COMMERCE, A STuDY OF MUTuAL FuNDs, H.R. REP. No. 2276, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 34 (1962). Indeed, it has been observed that similar constraints hamper the
effectiveness of the independent trustees of BElTs. See Note, Advisory Succession
in Real Estate Investment Trusts, 1974 DuxE L.. 123, 125-26. Drawing upon
practical experience, one BEIT expert has observed:
In the few trustees meetings that I have attended, it was quite apparent
that the "unaffliated" trustees had basically been invited to join the club,
that they were there as a pleasant part of their overall business relationship
with that banking organization. . . . [T]o expect them to exercise any
kind of independence in that kind of a setting was just truly out of the
question.
BElT Hearings, supra note 18, at 121 (statement of K. Campbell).
146 See text accompanying notes 110-12 supra. See also Nutt, A Study of
Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. BEv. 179 (1971).
147 See notes 200-06 infra & accompanying text.
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adequately to perform these duties should provide substantial incentives to independent trustees to exercise carefully their oversight functions in these areas.
III. ADVISORY FEES
A. Background
The advisory fee arrangements by which external investment
advisers are compensated for the management services performed
for the REIT represent a special class of conflicts of interest, because it is in this area that perhaps the greatest incentive for selfdealing by the adviser and adviser-affiliated officers and trustees of
the REIT exists. With respect to mutual funds, the Investment
Company Act'148 singles out the advisory fee problem for special
treatment, imposing stringent and specific requirements on regulated investment companies, their directors, and their investment
advisers, in connection with the negotiation of fees, permissible fee
arrangements, and the duration of advisory contracts. With the
exception of the general standards set forth in various statements
of policy promulgated by the MSCA,14 9 however, REITs and REIT
advisers have not been subject to comparable restrictions. As a
result of this lack of regulation, as well as factors inherent in the
externalized management structure common to most REITs, pronounced incentives for self-dealing by REIT advisers exist in the
area of fee compensation.
Again, it is useful at the outset to focus on crucial differences
between the internalized management structure of most operating
companies and the externalized management of the REIT. In the
usual corporate setting, the officers are employed and compensated
directly by the company the affairs of which they manage. The
fortunes of these officers correspond with those of the company in
three significant respects: (1) a decline in earnings and consequent
decline in the per share price of voting securities may give rise to
significant shareholder dissent and thus facilitate acquisition of voting control by interests hostile to those of existing management;
(2) many corporate officers and board members own significant
amounts of equity securities in the corporations they manage, and
thus have a direct interest in the company's economic performance;
and (3) most corporate officers receive, in addition to their fixed
148 Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (currently
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1976)).
149 See notes 53-55 supra & accompanying text.
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salaries, some bonus compensation based upon the performance of
the company. These compensation plans, moreover, are required
to be disclosed fully if the company qualifies as a "reporting company" under the Securities Exchange Act.150
In contrast, the typical REIT adviser is not vulnerable to dismissal by hostile takeover groups. The adviser owns or employs
virtually all of the operating and personnel assets of the REIT: the
files, the employees, the physical plant. Dismissal of the REIT
adviser, even in the event of acquisition of voting control by a
hostile takeover group, would be economically unthinkable.' 5' More
significantly, the principal economic interest of the adviser is represented by the income it derives from its advisory contract with the
REIT, not by ownership of equity securities in the REIT itself. 52
Although poor performance on the part of the REIT can result in a
decrease in the adviser's income, for reasons to be explained below,
this impact may be minimal or nonexistent depending on the fee
structure involved. 58 Finally, the typical REIT adviser does not
receive fixed compensation, but instead collects a fee based on asset
size and/or portfolio performance. Although the size of the fee is
disclosed, the amount of costs and profit is not; therefore, comparisions with fees charged by other REIT advisers are often meaningless. The end result of the external management structure is simple: the REIT adviser has tremendous incentives to increase its
own fees, even at the expense of REIT performance.
Prior to the precipitous decline in the fortunes of the REIT
industry, the fee arrangements between REITs and their advisers
yielded enormous profits to the advisers. One commentator estimates that after-tax profit margins of these advisers were in the
thirty to forty percent range, indicating pre-tax margins in the sixty
to eighty percent range. 54 The same commentator has estimated,
150 Proxy Rules, Schedule 14A, Item 7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1977).
151 For a discussion of the difficulties of discharging a mutual fund adviser, see
SECRumIS & EXCHANGE ComM'N, REPORT ON PuBLic Poricy ImPLICATIONS OF INVEsT:MENT CoMPANY GROWTH, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1966).

152 Financial institutions that sponsor REITs seldom own significant amounts of
shares of their REITs. The major exceptions include two relatively small bank
sponsored BEITs-HNC Mortgage and Realty Investors (sponsored by Hartford
National Corporation) and Realty Income Trust (sponsored by Industrial National
Corporation). REIT Hearings, supra note 18, at 27 (statement of K. Campbell).
See also Schulkin, Real Estate Investment Trusts, FINANcIAL
1971, at 74.
15a See note 223 infra & accompanying text.
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assuming that expense-to-portfolio ratios in 1975 represented the
break-even cost of operating a REIT, that approximately $170
million was the minimum cost of operating all REITs; by contrast,
the substantially higher expense ratios of the 1972-73 era represented total operating expenses of $280 million.155 The author
concludes, "[t]hese data raise the substantial question of whether
fees were not $100 or $110 million too high during those halcyon
days." 156
Prior to 1975, the predominate form of fee arrangement between REITs and their advisers called for compensation of the
adviser based on a fixed percentage of the managed assets. According to the 1974 survey of REIT advisory compensation plans by
Audit Investment Research, nearly ninety percent of the 112 trusts
surveyed compensated their advisers pursuant to such an arrangement.157 Of the REITs surveyed, only about twenty-five percent
reduced the adviser's percentage as the portfolio size increased, in
recognition of economies of scale associated with REIT management. 5 8 Moreover, slightly over half of the plans survey included
the unfunded portions of closed loans, as well as funded commitments, 59 in the asset base upon which the adviser's fee was calculated, even though the nonfunded portions of such loans typically
do not earn interest.
In addition to the base fee, seventy-five percent of the plans
surveyed contained an incentive fee, typically represented by a percentage of trust income over a base return on equity; 1110 none of the
155 AuDrr INvEsTazNr RESEAmcH, REIT Anvisony FEE PiANs, 1975, at 4 [hereinafter cited as .EIT CoMPENsAmToNLAr .aus, 1975].

156 Id.
PLANS, 1974, supra note 154, at 59. Most plans sur157R EIT COMPENsAo
veyed-nearly 70 percent-utilized a "first level" compensation base of 1.0-1.2 percent of the defined asset base. Id. The "first lever' base might be reduced as
portfolio size increased in recognition of the economics of scale associated with
REIT management.
158 Id.

159 Id. Most PElTs do not disburse the total amount of a loan at once, but
fund the lender in stages, generally as the project that is being financed is completed.
Under a fee arrangement calling for compensation based on funded and unfunded
commitments, however, the BElT pays a fee based on the entire loan amount, even
though only a portion has been disbursed.
160 Id. 59. Under a typical plan, the adviser receives 10 percent of all income
over the amount representing an eight percent return on shareholders' equity. Id.
Hence, if a REIT earned $10 million in a given fiscal year and had a total shareholders' equity of $100 million, the adviser would receive an incentive fee of
$200,000--i.e., 10 percent of $2 million-the latter figure representing the excess of
income over an eight percent return ($8 million) on shareholders' equity. Typically,
the return on equity is computed after the deduction of the total advisory fee in
determining the RELT's income.
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plans surveyed, however, contained a penalty clause if the return
on equity failed to attain an acceptable level.161 About half of the
plans survey also yielded incentive compensation based on a percentage of realized net capital gains, 16 2 although, once again, none
contained penalty clauses if the trust realized net capital losses. 16 3
Finally, about two-thirds of the plans surveyed in 1974 provided for additional compensation for REIT advisers based upon
performance of services for the REIT that were not covered in the
basic management agreement. 6 Typically, these services included
mortgage servicing fees, 165 forfeited commitment and standby fees, 6
67
and mortgage origination fees.

Even a cursory examination of the foregoing fee arrangements
reveals a conflict-ridden system in which massive incentives encourage the adviser to increase assets and engage in heavy debt leveraging for the purpose of increasing fee income. The base fee
predicated upon total portfolio size created a direct incentive to
make investments in real estate and mortgages secured by real
estate, irrespective of the quality or risk associated with such investments, even if imprudently heavy borrowing was necessary. 168
This incentive was further increased by the income received by
advisers from borrowers based on loan originations as well as servicing fees based on the amount of "contract paper" in the trust portfolio. Finally, incentive fees based on high returns on equity and/or
161 See id. 59.
162 Id.
163 Id.

164 d.

24-29, 59.

165 Such services include collections and disbursements on purchase contracts or
mortgages acquired by the REIT in connection with real estate sales. See generally
id. 29-36.

166 Standby and takeout commitments represent commitments to provide longterm financing for completed real estate projects based on the satisfaction of a number of conditions precedent. The borrower pays a fixed fee for such a commitment

and forfeits all or part of the fee if the conditions are not met. Id.
67Origination fees are typically paid by the borrower to the BEIT adviser as

consideration for the adviser's obtaining financing for the borrower from the BELT.
Id.
168See notes 251-54 infra & accompanying text. As one commentator has
observed:
The honey which drew the commercial banks, along with many others,

into sponsorship of REITs was a generous fee structure. Originally the
mortgage trusts paid their advisers from 1.0% to 1.2% of invested assets to
manage the trusts, a fee structure adapted from mutual funds. Typically,
these fee schedules included various bonuses, or incentives, for high shareholder return, capital gain, etc. This fee structure obviously provided a
strong incentive for BET advisers to recommend even higher levels of
leveraging, for the more invested assets, the higher the fee.
REIT Hearings, supra note 18, at 26 (statement of K. Campbell).
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capital gains, without corresponding penalties for low returns or
capital losses, created an incentive to place the trust in high-risk
investments as opposed to lower risk ventures with fewer possibilities for extraordinary profits. 1 9
Fee arrangements between REITs and their advisers are no
longer as profitable as was the case until 1974. With the decline in
the fortunes of the REIT industry, many advisers have been forced
to reduce compensation to a "cost only" basis.17 0 Some advisers
have retained a fee structure calling for compensation based on a
percentage of assets but, because of MSCA upper limits on compensation pegged to REIT income or net assets, have been forced to
accept vastly reduced fees or no fee at all.17 1 Finally, a large number
of REITs simply have severed with their advisers and have become
self-administered. 72
Whether this is a long-term development remains to be seen.
173 it
With the resurgence of the fortunes of the REIT industry,
seems at least as likely that a return to the days of conflict-laden
fee systems unchecked by statutory restraints or disinterested oversight by nonaffiliated trustees will result. Under these circumstances, regulatory precautions are in order. The next subsection of
this Article will focus on existing standards, with a view toward
suggesting a more effective regulatory response to the problems
posed by REIT advisory compensation arrangements.
B. The Existing Regulatory Approaches

As against the conflict-laden fee arrangements and the astronomical profits earned by REIT advisers, the legal standards imposed by state and federal law are, at best, inadequate. Under
the common law, the advisory contract between an investment
company and its adviser and the resulting fee are subject only to
the most limited judicial scrutiny. In the leading case, Saxe v.
Brady,174 shareholders of a mutual fund brought suit against the
fund's directors and its investment adviser, claiming that the management fee was unreasonable and excessive as a matter of law, and
that the nonaffiliated directors had breached their fiduciary duty
169 See note 226 infra.
17o See note 184 infra.
171
See AuDiT INVESTMENT REsEAnRc REIT ComPrNSATioN PLANS 1, 4-15
(1976) [hereinafter cited as BElT COMPENSAMON PLANS, 1976].
172 Id. 23-26; National Ass'n of Real Estate Investment Trusts, BElTs MoNnmT'Y
(April 1978).
173
See note 290 infra & accompanying text.
Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962).
17440
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by approving the contract. In dismissing the action, the court
passed the issue of the breach of fiduciary duty, and instead emphasized the fact that a majority of the shareholders had ratified the
advisory contract. Under those circumstances, the court ruled that,
unless the objecting stockholders could demonstrate that the contract amounted to a "waste of corporate assets," 175 the transaction
could not be voided, notwithstanding plaintiffs' allegations that the
directors, in approving the contract, had acted out of self-interest.1 76
Statements of policy promulgated by the Midwest Securities
Commissioners Association,'177 which have incorporated limitations
on the dollar amount of compensation allowable in REIT advisory
contracts, constitute a second source of regulation of REIT advisory
contracts. The most recent restrictions, in effect since 1970, limit
the permissible total costs of REIT operation, principally including
the advisory fee, to the larger of twenty-five percent of total REIT
income before deduction of the advisory fee, or 1.5 percent of
"average net assets." 178 In no event, however, may compensation
79
to the adviser exceed 1.5 percent of total trust assets.'

175 The court defined the waste standard in the following terms: "[The court's]
examination . . .is limited solely to discovering whether what the corporation has
received is so inadequate in value that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth what the corporation has paid." Id. at 486, 184 A.2d
at 610.
176 Id. at 478, 184 A.2d at 605.
7
1 7 See notes 53-55 supra & accompanying text.
178 The applicable provision provides, in full:
C. Fees and Expenses. The aggregate annual expense of every character paid or incurred by the trust, excluding interest, taxes, and expenses

in connection with the issuance of securities, shareholder relations, and
acquisition, operation, maintenance, protection and disposition of trust
properties, but including advisory fees and mortgage servicing fees and all
other expenses, shall not exceed the greater of:
1. 132% of the average net assets of the trust, net assets being defined as total invested assets at cost before deducting depreciation reserves, less total liabilities, calculated at least quarterly on a basis
consistently applied; or

2. 25% of the net income of the trust, excluding provision for depreciation and realized capital gains and losses and extraordinary items,
and before deducting advisory and servicing fees and expenses, calculated at least quarterly on a basis consistently applied; but in no event
shall aggregate annual expenses exceed 1%% of the total invested assets
of the trust.
The advisor shall reimburse the trust at least annually for the amount
by which aggregate annual expenses paid or incurred by the trust as de-

fined herein exceed the amounts herein provided.
I BLu SKY LAW REP. (CCH) ff4801.
179 Id.
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Ostensibly, the foregoing limitations should work to mitigate
the adviser's incentive to increase portfolio size through excessive
leverage and high risk investments for two reasons: (1) under the
1.5 percent of net assets limitation, because total liabilities are deducted from total assets in calculating the limit, a mere increase in
portfolio size offset by an equal increase in borrowing costs will,
all other things equal, yield the same fee limitations; and (2) the
twenty-five percent of income limitation eliminates the incentive
to invest in marginal or high-risk assets given the possible negative
impact on income that such investments would have if they began
to yield rates of return lower than the REIT's cost of borrowing
money or, worse, if the borrower was unable to repay the full
amount of principal. Hence, assuming that an advisory fee formula yielded a fee equal to or greater than the applicable limit,
it would prove profitable to the adviser to increase borrowings only
if the proceeds could be invested in assets that yielded more than
the trust's cost of borrowing and the adviser's cost of administering
the assets. In summary, the MSCA limitation on advisers' fees
achieves, to a significant extent, a closer congruence between adviser and investor interests.
For a variety of reasons, however, the MSCA limitations do not
represent an adequate regulatory response to the over-leveraging
and excessive risk-taking endemic to the REIT industry. First, as
previously pointed out,'8 0 only a limited number of states and one
stock exchange have adopted the MSCA standards. In 1974, five
of the ten largest REITs, representing total assets of almost $2.5
billion, did not observe MSCA limitations. 8 1 Second, the limitations only discourage further leveraging and investments in marginal or high risk investments if the prevailing advisory fee exceeds both the 1.5 percent of net assets and the twenty-five
percent of net income limitations. Under certain circumstances,
it is quite possible that an adviser to a trust that was earning no
income on its investments and that was only modestly leveraged
would nevertheless have an incentive to increase the trust's borrowings and invest the proceeds, notwithstanding the quality of the
additional investments or the prudence of increased debt lever18 0 See note 58 supra & accompanying text.
18IThese included Continental Mortgage Investors, First Mortgage Investors,
Great American Mortgage Investors, Continental Illinois Realty, and Guardian Mortgage Investors.

BEIT COmrnWSATION PLANS, 1974, supra note 154, at 44, 60-70;

REIT Hearings, supra note 18, at 276.
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age.182 Third, the MSCA limits ostensibly do not apply to non-fee
income received by advisers from borrowers in connection with loan
origination, nor to income received by an adviser or its affiliates for
services involving "acquisition, operation, maintenance, protection,
or disposition of trust properties." 183 Fourth, when the real estate
market turned precipitously downward, resulting in operating losses
for REIT advisers under the MSCA limitations, a number of REITs
simply agreed to abandon the loss-producing limitations and to reimburse their advisers for their costs of operation.1 8 4 These arrangements conveniently insulated the advisers from operating losses during hard times even though many had made huge profits when times
were still good-a classic "heads-I-win, tails-you-lose" situation.
Finally, and most significantly, the MSCA limitations are only
maximums-general approximations of the outside limits on permissible fees. They are not in any sense an appropriate substitute for
reasoned evaluation of the variety of factors that should be considered in determining the appropriateness of specific advisory compensation arrangements.
The federal securities laws do not directly address REIT's
advisory fee arrangements. 8 5 Recently, however, the staff of the
SEC has taken the position that failures to disclose departures from
typical investment management fee schedules are violative of the
182 Suppose, for instance, that a trust had $500 million in invested assets, $100
million in liabilities, and $400 million of shareholders equity:

Assets

$500

Long-term debt

$100

Shareholder equity

$400

Suppose also that the trust had no income in a given year and that the advisory
contract called for an annual fee of one percent of total assets.
The fee to the adviser would be $5 million; the upper limit on the fee would,
however, be $6 million (1.5 percent of net assets of $400 million). Under these
circumstances, the adviser could increase its fee by another $1 million simply by
borrowing another $100 million and investing in real estate assets, even if the additional assets showed no promise of yielding additonal income to the trust.
183 1 BLUE SKY LAw REBP. (CCH) g 4801.
184 As of the end of 1977, approximately 36 trusts had adopted an "expense
only" method of compensating their advisers, representing the largest category of
compensation arrangements between REIs and their advisers. The number would
have been even larger save for the fact that at least 12 trusts formerly on an
expense only basis had since shifted to self-administered status. National Ass'n
of Real Estate Investment Trusts, REITs MONTHLY, at 7 (Apr. 1978).
185 For a discussion of the coverage and liability standard of each of the relevant statutes see notes 80-101 supra & accompanying text.
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statutory fraud provisions under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 80 Indeed,
in one case, the SEC instituted an action against a REIT adviser
for failure to disclose allegedly "exorbitant" profit margins associated with the advisory fee it was receiving. 8 7 Notwithstanding
these considerations, however, comparatively few REIT advisers
even now disclose costs or profits in connection with advisory services
in public filings with the SEC or reports to REIT shareholders. 8 8
For reasons to be articulated later, REIT trustees must be provided with such information if they are to participate effectively
in advisory fee negotiations.
C. Possible Statutory Approaches: An Examination of Sections
15 and 36 of the Investment Company Act
For the most part, the problems associated with fee arrangements between REITs and REIT investment advisers parallel those
presented by compensation arrangements between regulated investment companies and their advisers. The mutual fund, like the
REIT, typically pays its adviser based on fund size, not on fund
performance, thus creating incentives for the adviser to increase
fund size through leverage or sales of additional shares, even though
this may not benefit existing fund shareholders. In addition, the
fund adviser, like the REIT adviser, typically dominates the affairs
of the fund, controls the proxy machinery, and selects individuals
to serve as "independent" directors on the fund's board. 8 9 Finally,
the fund adviser, like the REIT adviser, typically owns most of the
operating assets of the fund and employs operating personnel, making dismissal of the adviser a difficult if not totally unrealistic bargaining alternative in the negotiation of fee arrangements.
286 See, e.g., John G. Kinnard & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc.
L. REP. (CCH) f79,662 (1974). Cf. Commodity Management Serv. Corp., [19731974 Transfer Binder] Mtrr. FUNDS GumE (CCH) 110,035 (1974) (failure to disclose an advisory fee that exceeds normal industry standards would violate the
antifraud provisions of § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6
(1976)); Mexico Fund, SEC. REG. L. REP., July 30, 1975, at C-1 (fee of 1.5 percent of net asset value raises questions under Investment Company Act § 36(b).
187SEC v. Continental Advisers, Civ. No. 78-0066, (D.D.C., filed Jan. 16,
1978). See Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Litigation Release No. 8257 (Jan. 16,
1978).
88
'
See BElT COMPENSATION PLANS 1976, supra note 171, at 37:
Unhappily, very few REITs are reporting to their shareholders on a
regular basis the results of operations of their adviser. When this is done,
it is usually contained in proxy statements supporting expense-only fees.
Thus the REIT shareholder remains largely in the dark about how the
dollars of advisory fees are actually being spent. Perhaps it will take some
evolution toward greater maturity among REIT trustees to evaluate dis-

closure standards in this area.

18 0 See note 145 supra & accompanying text.
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The Investment Company Act contains two principal provisions designed to mitigate the possibilities for self-dealing in the
negotiation of investment advisory contracts between investment
companies and external advisers. These are sections 15 190 and
36.191 An examination of the legislative development of both sections is necessary to an understanding of the current legal interpretations of each.
As originally enacted, section 15(a) required that fund advisers
serve pursuant to written contracts setting forth all compensation to
be paid and that such contracts be initially approved by a majority
of shareholders and approved at least annually thereafter by a
majority of shareholders or directors. 92 The duration of the advisory contract was limited to two years. 193 Section 15(c) further
required that all modifications of advisory contracts be approved
by a majority of shareholders or directors of the company.194 Under
section 36 of the Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission was
empowered to seek injunctive relief against directors or investment
advisers for "gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust"; 195 neither
section 15 nor 36 explicitly authorized private suits by shareholders
against directors or advisers for excessive advisory fees.
The experience under both sections 15 and 36 proved to be
largely unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, mere approval of
advisory contracts by shareholders and directors was felt to be an
inadequate safeguard against overreaching by investment advisers. 9 6
Second, the Saxe v. Brady "waste of assets" standard effectively
shielded advisory compensation schemes from judicial invalida190 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1976).
-191 Id. § 80a-36.

392 Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 15(a), 54 Stat 789, 812

(1940).
193 Id.

194Id. at § 15(c), 54 Stat. at 813.
195 Id. at § 36, 54 Stat. at 841.
196H.R. RFP. No. 91-1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (memorandum of
SEC):
Insofar as the shareholders are concerned the management company
has control of the proxy machinery and there is never any contest over the

management fee, with the result that the shareholders have no realistic
choice except to send their proxies to representatives of the management
company or not to vote at all. Like shareholders generally, they will, as
a matter of routine, return their proxies if requested to do so by management.
Id. 87. See also Hearings before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the

House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No.
91-34, at 856 (statement of H. Budge).
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tion.197 Finally, although certain courts held that sections 15 and

36 implicitly created a private cause of action in favor of aggrieved
shareholders, 198 others declined to hold that such actions existed. 199
As a result of the foregoing factors, the SEC sponsored, and
Congress in 1970 passed, a bill substantially modifying sections 15
and 36.200 The bill accomplished three significant reforms. First,
it specified in section 15(c) that the director of a fund has a duty to
request and evaluate, and the investment adviser has a duty to
furnish, "such information as may reasonably be necessary to evaluate the terms of any [investment advisory] contract." 201 These
obligations are identical to the duties of disclosure, investigation,
and consideration that the courts have enunciated in construing the
section 36(a) fiduciary duty.20 2 Second, it replaced the "gross abuse
of trust" standard under the prior section 36 with a broader standard allowing the SEC to seek injunctive relief against officers, directors, and investment advisers for any "act or practice constituting
a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct." 20 3 As
previously indicated, 2°4 the legislative history indicates that Congress intended that nonfeasance or negligence on the part of a fund
director-in addition to misfeasance-would be actionable under
the amended section. In enacting the more stringent standard of
liability, Congress implicitly rejected the limited judicial scrutiny
contemplated by Saxe in favor of a deeper inquiry into the fairness
of an advisory contract.2 0 5 Finally, it created a new provision-sec197 See Nutt, supra note 146, at 93 (citing Kurach v. Weissman, 49 F.R.D.
304, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)); Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 548-49 (D.
Colo. 1965); Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (1961).
198 E.g., Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415

(2d Cir. 1961).
199 E.g., Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir.), vacated, 369

U.S. 424 (1961).
200 Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat.

1413, 1429 (1970).
201 Section 15(c) provides in relevant part:
It shall be the duty of the directors of a registered investment company
to request and evaluate, and the duty of an investment adviser to such
company to furnish, such information as may reasonably be necessary to
evaluate the terms of any contract whereby a person undertakes regularly
to serve or act as investment adviser of such company.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1976).
202
For a discussion of the content of this duty of disclosure, and a comparison with its common law counterparts, see notes 116-36 supra & accompanying text.
203 Section 36(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36a (1976).
20 4

205

See note 133 supra.

See Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 811-12, (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978).
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tion 36(b)-that imposed a specific fiduciary duty upon investment
advisers with respect to receipt of compensation from registered
investment companies, and further created a cause of action in
favor of fund shareholders against advisers for breaches of the
newly-imposed fiduciary duty20 6
In principle, the application of provisions similar to those contained in sections 15(c) and 36(a) and (b) of the Investment Company Act to advisory contracts between REITs and their investment advisers would serve several salutary purposes. In the first
instance, it would place an affirmative duty upon investment advisers to disclose all relevant information in connection with contract reapproval and, more importantly, would impose a duty upon
trustees to request and consider all such information. Under
Saxe v. Brady, which presumably defines the current standard by
which the fairness of REIT advisory contracts is to be judged, there
is no ostensible requirement that such information be produced or
considered in connection with ratification of advisory contracts by
shareholders or directors. As was discussed previously, the requirements of disclosure, investigation, and consideration are much more
stringent than their common law counterparts-the duties of loyalty
and care 2 07 Second, such provisions would clearly impose fiduciary
obligations upon the investment adviser with respect to the amount
of fee compensation-obligations that may or may not now be incumbent upon the adviser under the common law.208 Finally, such
provisions would reinforce the incentives of investment advisers to
discharge their statutory duties by creating an express federal cause
of action in favor of shareholders whose interests are adversely affected by unreasonable or excessive advisory compensation agreements.
Section 36(b) provides, in relevant part:
(b) For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a
registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty
206

with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments
of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company, or by
the security holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated

person of such investment adviser. An action may be brought under this
subsection by the Commission, or by a security holder of such registered

investment company on behalf of such company, against such investment adviser, or any affiliated person of such investment adviser, or any
other person enumerated in subsection (a) of this section who has a
fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or payments, for breach of
fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation or payments paid by such

registered investment company or by the security holders thereof to such
investment adviser or person ....
15 U.S.C. § 80a-36b (1976).
207
208

See text accompanying notes 116-36 supra.
See note 72 supra.
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Application to REITs of legislative provisions similar to
sections 15 and 36 is not, however, without problems. As presently
worded, there is some doubt as to whether section 36(a) creates a
separate private cause of action in favor of mutual fund shareholders. Two commentators have suggested, 20 9 and several courts
have held,210 that section 36(a) does not create a private right of
action. The 1970 amendments to the Acts expressly created only
one private cause of action-that afforded by section 36(b)-which
only provides a remedy against investment advisers or other persons
enumerated in section 36(a) who receive advisory compensation. 11
Given the explicit language of section 36(b), it has been argued
that Congress intended to preclude private causes of action for
breaches of the fiduciary duties imposed by sections 15(c) or 36(a)
upon the officers and directors of registered investment comIf this argument were accepted, shareholders could not
paniesm
hold fund directors liable for breach of their fiduciary duties with
respect to approval of the advisory contract except in the fortuitous
circumstance in which the directors were themselves recipients of
advisory compensation. With respect to REITs as well as mutual
funds, however, the existence of such a private cause of action
against directors or trustees, irrespective of their receipt of compensation, would serve a valuable deterrent function. Accordingly,
legislation directed at regulating REIT advisory fees should expressly create such a private cause of action. 21 3
The proposed legislation should avoid a second inadequacy of
section 36(b). As previously noted, section 36(b) imposes a fiduciary
duty upon investment advisers of registered investment companies
with respect to advisory compensation; the legislative history of the
section indicates that, consistent with this duty, the advisory fee must
be "reasonable." 214 The Investment Company Act does not, however, specify what constitutes a reasonable fee, what types of fee arrangements are inconsistent with the fiduciary duties imposed by
209 Crane & Walker, supra note 114.
21OBrouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated,
369 U.S. 424 (1961); Monheit v. Carter, 376 F. Supp. 334, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(§36(a), absent violations of other sections, creates no private cause of action).
211 Section 36(b) (3) provides: "No such action shall be brought or maintained against any person other than the recipient of such compensation or payments, and no damages or other relief shall be granted against any person other
than the recipient of such compensation or payments." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1976).
INsTrruroNs: INvEsTmNT MANAGEmENT 272-73
212 See R. PozEN, FiNANcLm
(1978); but see Freedman & Bosenblat, Duties to Mutual Funds, 4 REv. SEC. BEG.
937 (1971).
213 See text accompanying note 235 infra.
214 1970 Mutual Fund Amendment Hearings, supra note 145, at 188-89.
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section 36(b), or what factors are relevant in connection with such a
determination. In the original bill that culminated in the 1970
amendments to the Investment Company Act, the SEC specified a
number of factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of an advisory fee.215 The final version of the bill passed by
Congress did not refer to these or to any other factors in connection
with evaluation of the advisory fee. Moreover, the only cases decided under the amended sections 15(c) and 36(a) and (b) have involved the limited issue of fund-directed recapture of brokerage
commissions; 216 in the eight years since the passage of the 1970
amendments to the Act, no case has articulated the factors that fund
directors should consider in connection with the evaluation of the
reasonableness of advisory fees.
Section 15(c)'s general requirements of investigation and consideration of relevant information do not provide a useful directive
to trustees or directors who may have only minimal knowledge of
the economic and financial factors that shape the terms of the
advisory contract. As Circuit Judge Moore once observed, the
"paths of rectitude" that directors are required to follow in approving advisory contracts are paths "which neither Congress nor
the courts have laid out with such markers as may be easily discernible by the pedestrian director." 217 At a minimum, legislation
seeking to ensure informed and considered scrutiny of the fairness
of an advisory compensation scheme should provide an express
indication of the factors to be considered. In connection with the
approval of advisory contracts between a REIT and its adviser,
there are two critical factors that should be statutorily-required
215 These factors included: (1) the nature and extent of the services provided
to the fund; (2) the quality of the services rendered; (3) the economies of scale
attributable to fund growth; (4) the cost of comparable services delivered by other
externally and internally managed funds; and (5) the value of benefits other than
the advisory fee received by the fund. 1970 Mutual Fund Amendment Hearings,
supra note 145, at 188.

216 E.g., Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 934 (1977); Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978); Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).
217Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 425 (2d Cir. 1961) (Moore, J., dissenting). See also R. JENN NGs & H. MARSH, SEcuRns REGULATiON 1537 (3d ed.
1972) (the "reasonableness" standard of § 36(b) "is a lesson in the art of studied
ambiguity in drafting of statutes").

As Justice Frankfurter once observed:
[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direc-

tion to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does
he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these
obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
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items of disclosure, investigation, and consideration: (1) the costs
and profits associated with the advisory company's operations; and
(2) the economic performance of the REIT relative to that of similarly-situated REITs.
For several reasons, trustee scrutiny of the costs and profits
associated with administration of the REIT is necessary in order
effectively to evaluate advisory compensation arrangements.2 18 First,
if the adviser's profit margin is substantially higher than profit
margins earned by other REIT advisers performing similar services
and achieving comparable investment returns, the REIT may be
able to increase earnings by securing the services of another investment adviser. Alternatively, if, as was apparently the case in 197274,219 the profit margins of all REIT advisers are uniformly high,
the REIT may simply choose to become self-administered, thus
eliminating as a cost the substantial profits that would otherwise
go to the adviser. Third, if profits earned by advisers are uniformly high vis-b-vis rates of return for business enterprises with
comparable degrees of risk, disclosure of such profits should encourage market entry by other advisers, thus reducing the level of advisory fees charged to all REITS; if excessive advisory profit margins remain a well-kept secret, the market mechanism will not
operate to increase competition or reduce fees. Finally, and most
significantly, as a REIT's portfolio increases in size, it is probable
that the adviser will experience significant economies of scale with
respect to administrative costs. This, in turn, will yield substantially higher profits for the adviser if the base fee continues to increase proportionately, as administrative costs increase at a much
slower rate. Hence, a fee based on one percent of the size of the
portfolio may yield a normal profit on a $100 million portfolio, but
an unreasonably high profit on an $800 million portfolio. 220 If a
218 At least one other commentator has suggested the appropriateness of disclosure of advisers' profit margins in connection with evaluations by trustees directors of advisory contracts. Kraut, supra note 22, at 53. See also Mundheim &
Nutt, The Independent Directors of Mutual Funds, 6 WHmAToN Q. 8, 23-24 (1972)
(suggesting disclosure of advisers' cost and profit figures to mutual fund directors).
219
See notes 154-56 supra & accompanying text.
220 Similar concerns were voiced by the SEC in its 1966 report on investment
companies:
The Wharton Report found that as of 1960 most investment advisers
were not sharing the economies of size with the funds and their public
shareholders. In approximately four out of every five cases mutual fund
advisory fee rates were fixed and did not vary with the size of the assets
managed. Annual fees "tended to cluster heavily around the traditional
rate of 0.50 percent of average net assets."

Because of the absence of competition, the limitations of disclosure,
the ineffectiveness of shareholder voting rights and the difficulty of effec-
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REIT's independent trustees are to adequately assess the effect of
portfolio growth and the accompanying economies of scale in evaluating the fairness of an advisory contract, it is reasonable-indeed,
imperative-that they be furnished with data indicating the amount
of the adviser's operating costs and profits as portfolio size
221
increases.
It may, however, be argued that adequate market mechanisms
exist to regulate the size of advisory fees without disclosure of
profit margins. At any given time, there are a number of REITs
in the marketplace in which an investor may choose to invest. Each
has a record of return on equity. If the advisory fee is too high
compared with that charged by other REIT advisers with similar
performance records, the return on equity will be lowered vis-h-vis
that of other REITs, forcing down the price of that REIT's equity
shares and impairing its ability to obtain funds through new equity
offerings. A significant restriction of the REIT's ability to expand
portfolio size would in turn limit the adviser's ability to increase
its profits through the receipt of higher fees.
This argument has validity, however, only if REITs are limited
to capital expansion through new equity offerings, which is clearly
not the case. If, as was the case in 1972 to 1974, portfolio expansion is effected largely through debt leveraging,2 22 the market price
of equity shares may be of secondary importance to further expansion and may not provide an incentive to keep advisory fees low.
More significantly, the differences in return on equity by virtue of
disparate advisory fees may not have a sufficiently material impact
on return on equity to affect the price of a REIT's equity shares.
Hence, given a sufficiently large base of earnings and shareholder
equity, a REIT adviser may increase its fee and profit margin by a
tive action by unaffiated directors, advisory fee rates did not decline as
the funds grew. With some exceptions, it was the pressures generated
by the publication of the Wharton Report and the pendency of shareholder
litigation that led to such departures as there have been from the traditional flat fee rate of 0.50 percent. These departures have seldom been
substantial.
Purac PoLicy I1PLIcA-TONS, supra note 145, at 11-12 (footnotes omitted).

See
also id. 94-108.
221 In apparent recognition of the economies of scale associated with the management of large portfolios, certain REIT advisory contracts have called for a reduced base fee as a percentage of portfolio as portfolio size increases. However, as
of 1976, of 138 mortgage, equity, and hybrid BElTs surveyed by Audit Investment
Research, only 21 had such arrangements with their advisers. BElT COMwENSATION PLANS, 1976, supra note 171, at 41-53.
222 See notes 255 & 256 infra & accompanying text.
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significant amount with only a relatively insignificant negative im22 3
pact on income and total return on equity.
The second factor that is significant in evaluating the reasonableness of the advisory fee arrangement is the relative quality of
the management services rendered. A management fee and profit
margin of a REIT adviser that are substantially higher than those
earned by other REIT advisers may be justified if the investment
performance attributable to the adviser is superior to that of other
REITs; conversely, an inferior performance may counsel a lower
fee and profit margin. If a REIT does not achieve at least average
performance compared with similarly-situated REITs, the trustees
should expect the investment adviser to explain why and to outline
the steps being taken to improve performance.
Congress and the SEC have given recognition to the equities of
the general proposition that fees should reflect unfavorable as well
as favorable investment performance through regulation of incentive fee arrangements between regulated investment companies and
their investment advisers. Under section 205(l) of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940,224 Congress specifically prohibited compensation arrangements between investment advisers and their clients
based in whole or in part upon capital gains or capital appreciation
unless such arrangements provided for upward and downward adjustment of the fee to reflect comparative performance of the fund
with the market as a whole. In so doing, the legislation reflected
223 This may be illustrated as follows. Suppose a BEIT has a total portfolio
of $500 million, shareholders' equity of $250 million, and income of $30 million
before deduction of the advisory fee. Suppose that the advisory fee is one percent of the total portfolio size. Under these circumstances, the BElT's earnings
are $25 million, representing a 10 percent return on equity.
If the adviser raises its fee to 1.2 percent of portfolio, all else being equal,
the total advisory fee becomes $6 million-a 20 percent increase in income-but
the BElT's earnings decline to $24 million, only a 4 percent decrease. Total return on equity, moreover, declines from 10 percent to 9.6 percent, a decrease of
0.4 percent. The increase in the fee, on a per share basis, may be negligible, though
the increased return to the adviser is quite significant.
In this context, with respect to mutual fund advisory contracts, the following
pertinent observation has been made:
Another argument made was that fees that may look large in the
aggregate are really small. After all, one-half of 1 percent on a $5,000 investment is only $25 a year. .

.

.

Such an argument is sheer sophistry,

of course, because even the most outrageously exorbitant fees or charges
can be made to sound "reasonable" if they are spread over a very large
n this argument the industry, which wishes to use the fund's
group.
corporate form to exact such high fees, now wishes to divide the fee by
the hundreds of thousands of shareholders when we examine the fees
closely.
1970 Mutual Fund Amendment Hearings, supra note 145, at 858 (statement of
H. Budge).
224 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1976).
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the congressional concern that incentive fees based upon realized
return would encourage undue risk-taking by investment advisers
without an appropriate penalty for substandard performance when
measured against market performance. 225 Accordingly, section 205
specifically requires that any compensation arrangement based upon
net asset value proportionately increase and decrease in relation to
an appropriate index of securities prices.2 6
Significantly, incentive fee arrangements contained in most
REIT advisory contracts do not incorporate the upward and downward fee adjustment provisions required in mutual fund advisory
contracts under section 205(1) of the Investment Advisers Act. As
of 1976, almost all REIT advisory contracts surveyed incorporated
incentive fee arrangements. 227 These arrangements typically
awarded a stated percentage of all income to the advisers over and
above an amount representing a base return on equity; they contained no penalty, however, if income failed to attain the specified
base return.228 As a result, these types of fee arrangements tend to
reward excessive risk-taking by an adviser if investments produce
high returns, but impose no concomitant fee penalties if high-risk
investment policies yield substandard results.
At a minimum, regulatory legislation directed at REITs and
REIT advisers should require upward and downward fee adjustment provisions if performance fees are a part of the advisory contract. This is consistent with the congressional concerns embodied
in section 205(1) of the Investment Advisers Act. In addition, however, such legislation should go a step beyond mere regulation of
incentive fees, and statutorily mandate consideration of investment
performance by independent trustees in connection with all advisory contracts, not merely those that contain explicit incentive
225 H.R. REP. No. 91-1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1970); SECUmuES &
ExcHANGE ComM'N INSTrTuTONAL INvESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No.
92-64, 92 Cong., Ist Sess. xiv-xv (Summary Volume) (1971) [hereinafter cited as
oNAL INVESTOR STUDY].
INsTr
22
See
6 See H. BsNEs, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT MANACEMENT 5-47 (1978).
generally Fink, Performance Fees, 5 REv. SEC. REG. 829 (1972); Jansson, Whatever Happened to Performance Incentive Fees, 8 INsTITroNAL INVESTOR 101

(1974); Kennedy, The Uses and Abuses of Performance Measurement, 7 INST-

TTrONAL INvESToR 60 (1973); Manges, The Investment Company Amendments
Act of 1970-An Analysis and Appraisal After Two Years, 14 B.C. INn. & CoM.
L. REv. 387, 402-09 (1973).
227 REIT CoMPENsATIoN PL.i_,s, 1976, supra note 171, at 43-53.
228 See text accompanying notes 160-63 supra. A second, though less common, incentive fee arrangement awards the adviser a fixed percentage of net
capital gains realized by the REIT. Under these incentive arrangements, again,
it appears that no penalty is imposed on the adviser if the REIT realizes net
capital losses. BElT CoMPENsATIoN PL"Ns, 1976, supra note 188, at 43-53.
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fee provisions. Adoption of such a standard would accomplish two
important policy objectives.
First, a requirement that a REIT or mutual fund disclose its
risk-adjusted performance in relation to a meaningful performance
index and that such performance be considered in connection with
advisory fee negotiations could represent a significant means to
lessen the conflicts of interest inherent in fee structures that are
based solely on portfolio size. If portfolio performance becomes a
significant consideration in fee negotiations, the incentive to increase size through excessive debt leverage and/or the recommendation of high-risk investments may be significantly tempered if
such policies unduly jeopardize earnings performance vis-at-vis that
of other REITs.
Second, the use of risk-adjusted income performance encourages the trustees to reward superior investment and managerial
performance and to penalize substandard performance; substandard
performance by a REIT is indicative of poor investment advice and
should be reflected in a commensurately lower advisory fee. If, on
a comparative basis, the performance of the REIT is consistently
substandard, consideration should be given to retention of another
229
adviser or internalization of the advisory function.
The use of relative risk-adjusted performance 230 as a factor in
evaluating the reasonableness of the REIT advisory fee is not,
229

The idea that relative risk-adjusted performance should be an item of
required disclosure by mutual fund advisers has been endorsed by several commentators. In its 1970 study of mutual funds and other institutional investors, the
Twentieth Century Fund advanced the following related suggestion:
If potential investors were provided with "full disclosure," they would be
aware of the performance and costs of the fund offered to them compared
with the broad alternatives, including other load funds, no-load funds, and
closed-end investment companies (the latter frequently selling at a discount). This is another approach to more effective price competition in
the setting of sales charges, one not considered by the SEC in its 1966
report on investment companies. To implement this approach the SEC
might prescribe a way of presenting information on the front page of the
prospectus (and in some suitable part of the annual report) comparing
the performance and costs of the fund, over as long a period as feasible,
with the corresponding group averages for other load funds, no-load
funds, closed-end companies and the overall market performance weighted
by the portfolio composition of the fund in question or otherwise adjusted
for differences in portfolio risk.
I. Fnm-bm, MuTmu.A FuNDs Aism OsnR INs nmoNsAL INvEsToRs: A NE W Pt.E 105 (1970). See also Note, Mutual Funds and Their Advisers: StrengthSpEOTVe
ening Disclosure and Shareholder Control, 83 YAL E L.J. 1475, 1483-84 (1974),
reprinted in R. PozEN, supra note 212, at 333-34.
230 For the purposes of this Article, the term "risk adjustment" refers to the
§205 requirement that the performance of a fund be compared with "an appropriate index of securities prices." 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1976). See note 231 infra.
As one commentator has critically observed, this standard provides only a "qualita-
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unfortunately, without pitfalls. Diversified mutual funds may be
readily compared to a variety of performance indexes reflecting
movement of market price and/or the performance of other mutual
funds.231 Relative performance may be easily established since
portfolio securities are frequently liquid and are traded in sufficient
volume to establish an objective market price; these values may in
turn be compared to indexes also comprised of securities whose
values are readily ascertainable. REIT portfolios, by contrast,
whether comprised of mortgages, real estate, or some combination
thereof, are substantially less liquid; hence, they are less susceptible
to objective market valuation and comparison. More significantly,
difficult questions would arise as to the appropriateness of a given
index as a method of comparing relative performance. REITs
differ substantially in terms of degree of portfolio diversification,
type of portfolio asset, and degree of debt leverage. For example,
it would make little sense to compare the performance of a REIT
that invested principally in FHA-secured residential mortgages with
little or no leverage, with that of another REIT whose portfolio
was comprised of high-risk construction and development mortgages or equity interests. Because of the greater degree of risk
associated with the investments made by the second REIT, one
would expect a higher rate of return than that produced by the
first, and such a comparison would presumably be "inappropriate"
for purposes of section 205.232 The example does, however, provide
an intimation of the problems that could arise in the course of the
"appropriateness" inquiry when variables such as portfolio diversification and degree of leverage complicate the situation.
These problems are not insuperable, however. Merely because
the value of a portfolio consisting of real estate or real estate-secured
mortgages is more difficult to determine than portfolios consisting
of debt and equity securities does not mean that valuations cannot
tive" measure of risk adjustment-not the more intricate calculus required by
capital market theory. Note, supra note 229, at 1479-82. Development of a
theoretically valid risk adjustment mechanism is beyond the scope of this Article.
For a general discussion of the concept of risk adjustment of investment portfolios for comparative purposes, see BrNEs, supra note 226, at 5-49 to 5-50; Cohen,
The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YA15 L.J. 1604, 1607-11 (1971).
231 See, e.g., Arthur Lipper Corporation Indexes (published weekly in
BARmON'S). This does not mean that a performance index may be indiscriminately
established: the index must reflect performance of funds that are similarly situated
or of securities of the type comprising the investment company's portfolio. See
Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 315 (Apr.
6, 1972), [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,694. See also
Mexico Fund, SEc. REG. & L. EPa. (BNA) at C-1 (July 30, 1975); Hyperion Fund,
Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCII) ff79,315.
232 See note 231 supra.
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be made or that comparisons of relative performance are invalid.
As previously indicated, 233 a number of REITs utilize incentive
compensation arrangements predicated upon returns on shareholders' equity. Given the large numbers of REITs in existence,
it should be possible to determine the average returns on equity for
REITs with similar portfolios and investment objectives and to
make valid comparisons between the performance of an individual
REIT and the appropriate index. To the extent return on equity
failed to reflect unrealized portfolio gains, appropriate adjustments
could be made where such gains could be adequately substantiated
234
through current independent appraisals or analyses.
D. Recommendation
Given the considerations outlined herein, any legislative approach to regulation of REIT advisory fees should, at a minimum,
accomplish two things. First, it should impose a fiduciary duty
upon the investment adviser to disclose, and upon the nonaffiliated
trustees to consider, all factors relevant to an evaluation of the reasonableness of the advisory fee arrangement. Second, it should
provide at least minimal guidance to those individuals concerning
the types of factors relevant to an evaluation of the fee arrangement.
The fiduciary concepts that are the underpinnings of sections
15 and 36 of the Investment Company Act represent a fundamentally sound approach to regulation of compensation arrangements
between REITs and their investment advisers. The provisions
do not place artificial limitations on investment advisory contracts as do the current limitations utilized by the MSCA. Rather,
they place the burden on those individuals best-situated to evaluate
and negotiate the most favorable arrangements for the REIT-the
See note 226 supra & accompanying text.
234 Generally speaking, financial accounting principles do not permit recognition of increases in market value of assets short of sale or other disposition of the
asset. Such gains will typically occur in connection with real estate interests
acquired by equity and hybrid BElTs, although mortgage BElTs may also ex233

perience capital appreciation if prevailing interest rates for comparable investments
fall below the actual rates of interest at which the BElT has extended loans. To
the extent that reported net income-hence, return on equity-fail to reflect such
increases, adjustments in income can and should be made to present a more
realistic comparative picture of the investment performance of the REIT. Adoption of a measure of "current value" accounting by REITs is not a revolutionary
proposition. A 1975 AICPA proposal advocated that BElTs be required to calculate alowances for losses on loans and foreclosed properties utilizing an estimate
of "recoverability" of the collateral property. AccouNrn, ST.NDmns DivisIoN,
AmpaciruAN I sTrru'TE or CERTFIED PUBLIc AccoTNrTANTs, STATEmENT OF PosiTioN ON AccouN=vGo PtACnCES OF REAL ESTATE I NvEs-mNT'TusTs 2, 6 (June

27, 1975). A necessary step in the recoverability calculation is valuation of the
underlying property. Id. 4-5.
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REIT trustees. In addition, like the Investment Company Act, the
creation of a private cause of action should provide an effective
means of enforcement of this provision as well as redress for aggrieved REIT shareholders. Specifically, this Article has suggested
that such legislation should create a cause of action against REIT
trustees as well as investment advisers for failure to discharge their
respective fiduciary obligations. As previously indicated, this is not
altogether clear under current provisions of the Investment Com235
pany Act.

The principal inadequacy of the Investment Company Act is its
failure to articulate more clearly the factors that are relevant to the
evaluation of advisory compensation agreements. It is suggested
that any legislation dealing with regulation of REIT compensation
arrangements must include a minimum specification of the factors
to be disclosed to and considered by the REIT's nonaffiliated trustees in reaching this determination, including: (1) a detailed description of the costs and profits associated with administration of the
REIT; and (2) a comparison of the REIT's investment performance
with that of a meaningful index of performance of other similarlysituated REITs.
IV.

REGULATION OF RISK TAKING

A. Background

The final area in which the regulatory concerns embodied in
the Investment Company Act apply to REITs is that of the regulation of investment risk-taking. The Investment Company Act restricts the amount of risk allowable to a regulated investment company principally through restrictions on debt leverage. Specifically,
section 18 of the Act 236 prohibits the issuance of senior securities or
bonds by open-end investment companies, 237 and allows borrowings

from banks by open and closed-end companies (or the issuance of
senior securities or bonds by closed-end companies) to the extent
that the fund's assets exceed total bank debt by specified percentages. 238
235 See notes 209-12 supra & accompanying text.

15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (1976).
Section 5 of the Act divides management companies (defined in § 4) into
"open end" and "closed end" companies. An "open end" fund is one that issues
new shares or has outstanding redeemable securities that it has issued. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-4, 80a-5 (1976).
238 See text accompanying note 262 infra. Although not relevant to the present
inquiry, § 12(a) of the Act and the interpretive releases thereunder place further
restrictions on risk-taking by regulated investment companies through restrictions
on margin purchases of securities and, except in specified instances, short sales.
236
237

15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a) (1976).
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At present, REITs are not subject to comparable regulatory
restrictions on debt leveraging or, for that matter, any other form
of risk-taking. The declarations of trust of a number of REITs
contain limitations on the maximum amount of borrowings, designated as a multiple of net assets, which the REIT may incur. These
limitations, however, tend to be extremely liberal, permitting total
borrowings/net asset multiples of from 300 to 800 percent. 239 The
current MSCA statement provides that the aggregate borrowings of
the trust shall not be "unreasonable" in relation to the trust's net
assets, as defined; the statement provides no guidance, however,
concerning what constitutes an unreasonable degree of debt leverage. 240

The federal securities laws contain no affirmative restric-

tions on risk-taking by REITs apart from the general disclosure
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 241 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.242 The restrictions imposed by section 23
of the Federal Reserve Act 243 on national banks respecting loans
to affiliates have not been construed to apply to loans by banks to
REITs that they sponsor and advise, even though such restrictions
were designed to mitigate excessive risk-taking of precisely the type
that has occurred between banks and bank-sponsored REITs.2 44
The unique management structure of the REIT creates special incentives, typically absent in other forms of business enterprise, to engage in risk-taking through excessive debt leveraging.
As previously discussed, the fee structures of most REITs have been
(and in many cases still are) based upon the total size of the REIT's
investment portfolio, including funded as well as unfunded commitments. 245 Thus, the REIT's adviser may increase the size of the
fee by increasing the REIT's outstanding debt, and thereby inflate
the number of outstanding loan commitments for purposes of fee
determination. Advisory contracts that contain an additional incentive provision based on earnings in excess of a defined amount,
and omit a concomitant penalty clause based on substandard earnings, create an additional incentive to engage in excessive risk239

See Appendix C.

240 Subsection D of the MSCA statement provides, in full: "Leverage. The
aggregate borrowings of the trust, secured and unsecured, shall not be unreasonable in relation to the net assets of the trust, as defined in paragraph C hereof,
and the maximum amount of such borrowings in relation to the net assets shall be
stated in the prospectus. 1 BLuE S y L. REP. (CCH) f4801.
241 15 U.S.C.

§§ 77a-77bbbb (1976).

Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
24312 U.S.C. §371(c) (1976).
244 See notes 284-86 infra & accompanying text.
245
See notes 157-59 supra & accompanying text.
242
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taking through leverage and the recommendation of high-risk
investments. As previously indicated, many REIT advisory con2
tracts currently contain such incentive provisions.

46

The requirements of the Internal Revenue Code create even
further incentives to leverage.

Under section 857(a)(1), 247 in order

to qualify for tax-exempt status, a REIT must distribute to shareholders at least ninety percent of its total income on an annual
basis. As a result, the REIT is precluded from building substantial
retained earnings as a basis for further expansion and must instead
resort to debt leverage or new offerings of equity to generate funds
for further expansion. And, although the use of equity offerings
creates a more favorable debt-equity ratio for the REIT, expansion
through periodic equity offerings may require substantial interim
increases in the REIT's debt, thus increasing the debt-equity
248
ratio.
A final factor contributing to the incentive to leverage REITs
relates to the incidence of sponsorship of REITs by financial institutions, especially commercial banks. As of the end of 1974,
thirty-nine REITs, representing almost one-third of total industry
assets, were advised by commercial banks or subsidiaries of commercial banks.249 These banks, in turn, provided massive credit facilities, including lines of credit and term and revolving loans, to the
REITs that they sponsored. 250 The incentives to loan heavily to
See note 227 supra & accompanying text.
For tax years ending after 1979, the income dis247I.R.C. §857(a)(1).
tribution requirement is raised to 95%.
248 It is advantageous for a REIT to offer new equity shares only if the price
of those shares exceeds the book value of existing shares. Otherwise, a new equity
offering will lower the book value of existing shares. To maintain a share price
in excess of book value, however, it is necessary consistently to increase earnings
and dividends. To effect this performance, the REIT must consistently increase
the size of its portfolio-an increase that is often financed through additional borrowings. As one commentator has observed:
[T]he most important force [behind the rapid use of leveraging] . . . was
the constant pressure to increase earnings per share, quarter by quarter.
This was because consistent earnings and dividends were vital to keeping
the share price over book value. And only trusts with share prices over
book value could raise new capital-since the trust cannot add to permanent capital by retaining earnings.
REIT Hearings, supra note 18, at 26. For a more comprehensive explanation of
the debt-equity cycle, see Note, Real Estate Investment Trusts: A Current Assessment, 39 BROOKLYN L. REv. 590, 602-03 (1973).
249 NATIONAL Ass'N OF REAL ESTATE INVEsT.VmNT TRUsTs, BEIT FAcTBooK,
246

1975.
250 Although no data have been collected indicating the size of borrowings
by all BEITs from their sponsor banks, selected instances suggest that the amounts
are sizable. Hence, as of 1976, Chase Manhattan Corporation had loaned approximately $142 million, an amount approaching the bank's legal loan limit,
to Chase Manhattan Mortgage and Realty Trust, and Bankers Trust had advanced
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the RETs that they sponsored were several. First, as previously
described, the banks could derive higher advisory fees as the size
of the REIT's portfolio expanded in response to greater debtfinanced investment opportunities. 25 1 Second, the issuance of loan
commitments to the REIT provided immediate income to the
sponsor bank with little or no corresponding cost; 252 in the event
that the loan commitment was actually funded, the bank also
earned interest on the funded balances. Third, laws that effectively
prevented commercial banks from extending certain types of loans
could be circumvented if the loans were made by the bank's REIT,
thus allowing the bank to offer otherwise prohibited financing to its
good customers.2 53 Finally, banks that sponsored and financed
REITs often derived income from balances maintained by the
REIT and its borrowers with the bank as well as from the advantages
254
of "float" on substantial checking transactions by the REIT.
$75 million, representing 55% of the trust's bank financing, to BT Mortgage Investors. Subsidiaries of Fidelcor, Inc., a bank holding company, had, as of November 1977, $41 million in outstanding loans to Fidelcor Growth Investors, representing nearly half of that trust's institutional borrowings. Other banks have acquired
large amounts of assets from their BEITs in return for reductions of outstanding
debts from the REITs to their sponsor banks, including Continental Illinois Corporation ($62 million) and Hartford National Corp. ($15-20 million). See REIT
Hearings, supra note 18, at 28 (statement of K. Campbell); Fidelcor Growth Investors, Annual Report on Form 10-K (Year Ended Nov. 30, 1977), at F-9.
251 See notes 168-69 supra & accompanying text.
252 As one expert observed:
In the boom days of 1971-73, the REITs were earning handsome profits
writing standby commitments for each other's projects. The standby commitment is essentially a blank check in which a BEIT or other lender
agrees to fund a mortgage loan, often on onerous terms, if the developer
is unable to borrow anywhere else when a building is completed. Such
fees dropped almost immediately to the bottom line in most BEIT accounting until rules were changed last year. At the same time banks were
issuing a parallel volume of so-called back-up line commitments which
BEITs then used to support sale of commercial paper. They were especially helpful in allowing BHCs [bank holding companies] to earn handsome profits, which again dropped to the bottom line, without using any
funds.
REIT Hearings, supra note 18, at 27 (statement of K. Campbell).
253
Sponsoring a REIT enables a commercial bank to bypass indirectly a
number of restrictions which may hamper its acquisition and lending of
funds. For example, during the past tight money period a REIT could
sell commercial paper without an interest rate ceiling, while banks were
subject to such ceilings. Thus, a bank may want to sponsor a REIT in
order to assure its customers of a source of real estate funds.
Schulkin, Recent Developments in the REIT Industry, NEW ENGLAND ECoN. REV.
10 (September-October 1972).
254 "For example, if a trust was lending $20 million to a contractor, and a
check was issued on the adviser's bank on Friday, the check mightn't clear until
the following Wednesday, giving the bank six days of interest on the check's
'float."' Falling Out: Real Estate Trusts Feud With Advisers Over Their Obligations, Wall St. J., March 13, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
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The tremendous incentives to engage in debt leveraging were
reflected in the debt-equity structures of most REITs prior to the
1974 to 1975 collapse of the real estate market. Between 1971 and
1974, the year-end leveraging ratios of REITs increased as follows:
1971-51 percent, 1972-105 percent, 1973-161 percent, 1974 (June)
-169 percent.25 5 From 1972-74, assets of the largest 134 REITs
increased by 135 percent; during this same period, however, the
increase in bank debt of the industry increased by 970 percent. 256
The largest debt-equity ratios were incurred by the short-term
mortgage REITs. Between June 1972 and June 1974, although
gross income for the fifty-eight largest short-term mortgage REITs
more than doubled ($2.5 million to $5.7 million), interest expenses
for non-convertible debt increased by over six times ($627,000 to
$4 million). 257 During this same period, while total income for
short-term REITs more than doubled, the percentage of net income
distributed to shareholders declined from nearly fifty percent to
only two percent. Simultaneously, interest expense on non-convertible debt increased from about twenty-five percent of gross
258
income to over seventy percent.
The highly-leveraged posture in which most REITs found
themselves when the real estate market collapsed in 1974-1975
contributed heavily to the collapse of the REIT industry itself. Reduced income from borrowers unable to meet interest payments, as
well as large additions to loss reserves reflecting reduced collateral
values, squeezed REIT earnings badly enough; in addition, the
large debt service on loans to REITs from banks, as well as the increasing interest rates that accompanied the escalation of the prime
rate, placed an intolerable burden on many REITs. As a result,
many REITs were forced to renegotiate terms of outstanding bank
loans, in many cases substantially extending maturity dates and reducing interest rates.m9 Those REITs that had leveraged to the
greatest degree were among the worst performing trusts during this
255 Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Real Estate Investment Trusts: A Background Analysis and Recent Industry Developments, 1961-1974, at 21 (Economic
Staff Paper, February 1975). Figures represent the ratio of the sum of short-term
debt (commercial paper, bank loans owed, and credits) to the sum of equity
shares plus convertible debentures outstanding.
256 REIT Hearings, supra, note 18, at 40-42 (statement of B. Neuberger).
257 Neuberger & Hughes, Operating Performance of Short Term Trusts, 197274, REIT Rlvmw, February 1976, at 1.
258RELT Hearings, supra note 18, at 78-79 (study by B. Neuberger and M.
Hughes).
259 Id. 304 (report by Drexel Burnam & Co., Inc.).
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period.26 0 According to one study that identified the impact of a
series of factors on REIT profitability, the higher the percentage of
nonconvertible debt to total capital, the worse the performance of
the trust.261

B. Regulation of Risk in REITs: Limitations on Debt Leverage
The tremendous inducements to engage in excessive leveraging,
as well as the disastrous experience of REITs with excessive debt
leveraging, suggest that regulatory precautions are in order. Direct
controls upon debt leverage modeled after those imposed by the
Investment Company Act represent the most straightforward approach to the problem; that approach, however, is not without major
drawbacks.
As previously indicated, 262 section 18 of the Investment Company Act263 imposes stringent limitations on risk-taking by regulated investment companies, principally through limitations on
debt leveraging. These limitations effectively restrict the type as
well as the amount of debt that an investment company may incur.
Specifically, section 18 (f ) limits borrowings by open-end companies
to bank loans, and then only to the extent that such loans are covered by assets representing at least 300 percent of the value of such
debt. 26 Under section 18(a), by contrast, closed-end companies
may issue senior securities including bonds and preferred stock, but
only if asset coverage represents 300 percent of the value of outstanding bonds and 200 percent of the value of outstanding pre265
ferred stock.
The legislative history of section 18 suggests that inclusion of
the section was prompted by two concerns. The principal concern
was that excessive leveraging would create an increased risk of
bankruptcy in the event of market downswings. The SEC's Investment Trust Study purported to find a strong relationship between
leverage and mutual fund performance. 2 6 The Commission concluded that this negative relationship created a degree of risk with
respect to securities of investment companies that was inconsistent
260
261

BElT FAcTBooin, supra note 1, at 34-41.
REIT Hearings, supra note 18, at 63-64 (study by B. Neuberger and M.

Hughes).
262 See note 236 supra & accompanying text.

15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (1976).
Id. § 80a-18(f).
265 Id. § 80a-18(a). Section 18(h) defines "asset coverage." Id. § 80a-18(h).
266
IwsTl,
TRuST STUDy, supra note 24, at 478-79, 921-23.
263

264
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with the character of such companies. 267 A subsidiary concern was
the protection of holders of senior securities and bonds from conflicts of interest between their objectives and those of the holders
of common shares. According to the SEC, the restrictions on issuance of senior securities and bonds would eliminate the undesirable
conflicts in management objectives that are inherent in financial
structures consisting of multiple classes of junior and senior securi268
ties and debt instruments.
Consistent with these Congressional objectives, the regulation
of risk-taking through direct limitations on debt leveraging has
proven to be an effective means of insulating regulated investment
companies from the effects of market downturns. Since 1940, the
incidence of bankruptcy by regulated investment companies has
been virtually nil.269 More significantly, this analysis suggests that,
had REITs been subject to limitations similar to those of section
18, many of the disastrous losses and perhaps all of the bankruptcies
270
experienced by highly leveraged REITs could have been avoided.
However, several factors militate against subjecting REITs to
risk limitations similar to those imposed by section 18. First, any
statutory limitation on debt leverage will necessarily be largely arbitrary. The limitations imposed by section 18 apply to all regu26 7
Investment Company Act Hearings, supra note 24, at 1027-30. See also id.
265-66; PuBrac PoLicY LMPLiCATIONS, supra note 145, at 65-67.
268 Spokesmen for the SEC during the hearings stated the following concerns:

We have found continual conflict between the senior and junior securities [of investment companies], where the junior securities are interested in

appreciation and the senior securities are interested in safety. Yet the
safety factor is entrusted to the very people who are interested in speculation.
Where you try to limit the number of different classes outstanding, try
to legislate or regulate with respect to what protective features they
should have, we say they should be like a mutual savings bank-one
class of stock, no conflicts, everybody has a pari passu share in the voice
of the management.
Investment Company Act Hearings, supra note 24, at 268-71 [statements of L.

Smith & D. Schenker].
269 Although there does not appear to be a definitive compilation of registered
investment companies who have filed for reorganization under the Bankruptcy

Act, a review of available records indicates that only six such companies have filed
for bankruptcy since the passage of the Investment Company Act.

These include:

Central States Electric Corp., see In re Central States Electric Corp., 30 SEC 680
(1949); Selected Investments Trust Fund, Inc., see SEC, Corporate Reorganization

Release No. 121 (May 12, 1959); First Home Investment Corp. of Kansas, see In re
First Home Investment Corp., 308 F. Supp. 597 (D. Kan. 1973); Shamrock Fund,

Inc.; Vanderbilt Growth & Income Fund, Inc.; and All American Fund, Inc., see
Letter from Richmond Pogue, Investment Company Institute, to William L. Martin
(July 3, 1978) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
270 See REIT Hearings, supra note 18, at 96-97 (statement of R. Schotland).
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lated investment companies, irrespective of the types of assets in
which the companies typically invest; thus, funds with the most conservative investment policies are subject to the same limitations on
debt financing as the most aggressive and risk-oriented funds.
Clearly, however, the liquidity and low degree of the risk associated
with the investment securities of the former companies justify less
stringent regulation of debt leverage than that which is appropriate
with respect to the latter companies. Like mutual funds, REITs
differ widely with respect to the safety and liquidity of their portfolio investments. Even if the statutory limitations were varied in
some way to reflect portfolio composition, it is doubtful that the
provisions could effectively distinguish between the many types of
risk associated with various REIT portfolios; obviously, a unitary
standard such as that imposed by section 18 would fail to distinguish between the diversity of risk situations represented by
REIT portfolios.
Second, limitations on risk-taking through debt leverage restrictions have been criticized as forcing inefficient portfolio investments by disregarding leverage as a means of risk-optimization.
Hence, under a body of principles generally referred to as "portfolio theory," 271 given (1) a series of quantifiable measures of risk
associated with a variety of investments,2 72 and (2) the anticipated
returns on each such investment,2 73 it is possible to derive a quotient reflecting the return per unit of risk associated with any given
portfolio of investments. 274 The portfolio that produces the highest
return per unit of risk is the "optimum portfolio." 275 The risk
associated with this portfolio may, in turn, be increased in the most
efficient manner simply by increasing the debt leverage associated
271

For a concise explanation of the principles of portfolio theory and a cri-

tique of leverage limitations under these principles, see Cohen, The Suitability Rule
and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604, 1607-17 (1971); Note, Regulating RiskTaking by Mutual Funds, 82 YALE L.J. 1305, 1314-20 (1973).
272
Bisk is measured as the amount of variation in all possible returns that an
investment may produce. Cohen, supra note 271, at 1608.
273 The anticipated return is represented by the average of all possible returns
on an investment, weighted according to probability of occurrence. Id.
274 In order to derive this figure, one subtracts the rate of return associated
with risk-free investments (e.g., United States treasury bills) from the anticipated
rate of return. The resulting figure, representing the return to the investor for
taking risk, is then divided by the risk measure, yielding a quotient representing the
return per unit of risk. Id.
275 It is "optimum" because any portfolio that yields a lower risk quotient
would subject the investor (1) to a higher degree of risk for the same return;
(2) the same degree of risk for a lower return; or (3) a higher degree of risk
for a lower return. Assuming that the rational investor seeks to ma'dmize return
and minimize risk, he would consider any of these alternatives inferior to the
"optimumn" portfolio.
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with that portfolio. 27 1 If, however, the portfolio may not be leveraged to increase risk, the only alternative is to alter the composition
of portfolio securities in favor of higher risk investments. According to portfolio theory, this will, by definition, produce a portfolio
that yields a lower rate of return per unit of risk, or a less than
optimum portfolio. Although portfolio theory has principally been
applied to portfolios consisting of debt and equity securities, it has
equally valid theoretical application to the management of real
271
estate portfolios.
276 The proposition that an investor may maximize return by adjusting for
risk through leverage is known as the "separation theorem." Simply stated, the
separation theorem holds that any change in the composition of the optimum portfolio will result in a lower return per unit of risk. Any investor wishing to increase
risk associated with the optimum portfolio should leverage the portfolio, because
this will maintain the return per unit of risk that the optimal portfolio represents. Hence, if the unleveraged optimum portfolio returns 2 percent for each
unit of risk, then borrowing doubles the risk, but doubles the possible return as
well, thus maintaining the optimum return per unit of risk associated with the
unleveraged optimum portfolio. See Cohen, supra note 271, at 1609-11.

277 Assuming that it is possible to identify the range of possible returns on
various types of real estate investments as well as the probability of each return,
one could theoretically derive a series of quotients reflecting return per unit of risk,
and thus identify the "optimum" real estate portfolio.
This theory relies on critical assumptions that may not hold true for REITs.
Specifically, it assumes that one can determine with accuracy the possible returns
and the respective probabilities associated with any real estate investment The
experience of REITs in this decade suggests that BElT managers in fact did not
(and could not) accurately assess these factors. The history of real estate values
since the early 1930s gave few lenders or developers cause to perceive any "downside" risk associated with real estate development. See e.g., P. Scnur=, COmIn fact,
MERCIAL PAPER AND THE REIT INDusTnY iN PERsPECTIVE 9-14 (1973).
subsequent events demonstrated that the downside risk was substantial. More
significantly, the prime rate in 1973-74 rose to unprecedented levels, a factor dictated by monetary policies that were largely beyond the REIT's ability to control
or predict. Finally, BElT managers may have taken excessive risks by extending
loans to meet competition from other ,EITs to maintain or increase earnings per
share when the risk/return calculation dictated caution. Available statistical data
are inconclusive on this point, e.g., Hines, Risks, Yields, Capitalization and Management Fees of Mortgage Trusts, 41 APPRausAL J. 484 (1973), although excessive
industry competition and resultant imprudent lending policies have been emphasized as factors that explain the explosive portfolio growth. Kaplow, Leaders
Blast Irresponsible Overbuilding; Many Go Condo, APArTMszr CoNsTruCnoN
NEws, June 1972, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1971, § 2, at 63, col. 7.
These problems notwithstanding, portfolio theory cannot be discounted in
evaluating the efficacy of risk regulation through restrictions on leverage. The
confluence of unpredictable events that precipitated the downturn in the real estate
sector in 1974 were arguably atypical; in less volatile economic circumstances, risk
and return should be more predictable, and hence more adaptable to the principles of portfolio theory. At the very least, it can be expected that consideration
of the "downside" risk will more often become a meaningful factor in real estate
investment decisions. Moreover, the competitive atmosphere that fostered excessive
portfolio expansion and risk-taking has been tempered significantly since the REIT
downturn. Thus, REITs and financial institutions lending to REITs may act more
rationally in future years in evaluating risk factors relative to rates of return than
was the case earlier in the decade.
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Finally, although REITs and mutual funds are both pooled
asset enterprises that invest in portfolios that require similar analysis of risk considerations, their economic roles as financial intermediaries differ significantly. Institutional investors, including
banks and mutual funds, typically effect transactions in the secondary capital markets 278 by purchasing and selling outstanding
debt and equity securities. Although such institutions participate
in the purchase of primary debt and equity securities, their participation in secondary equity markets greatly exceeds their activity as
purchasers of primary offerings.279 REITs, by contrast, function
principally as primary financial intermediaries, channeling funds
from investors and financial institutions into new mortgages and
equity investments.2 0 Indeed, legislation granting tax-exempt
status to qualified REITs was originally enacted, in part, to stimulate primary real estate investments. 281 The imposition of leveraging restrictions on REITs would undoubtedly curtail their ability
to discharge this vital intermediary function by restricting access to
major financial sources, including banks and the commercial paper
market.
C. Recommendation
The foregoing discussion suggests that limitations on debt leveraging comparable to those imposed on investment companies may
be an inefficient and undesirable approach to the regulation of excessive risk assumption by REITs. The solution lies in implementing less limiting approaches to the over-leveraging problem that
are tailored to the distinctive problems of the REIT.
As previously stated,28 2 excessive leverage may be encouraged
by advisory compensation agreements that yield higher fees as portfolio size increases. Legislation imposing a fiduciary standard on
278

Sales of newly-issued securities (primary sales)

are distinguished from

sales of outstanding securities (secondary sales) by the fact that the proceeds of
primary sales are at the disposal of the issuing corporations. Secondary sales, by
contrast, involve sales of outstanding securities among investors, with no immediate impact on the funds available to the issuing corporation. INsn'runoN.
INVESTOR STuoy, supra note 225, at 2336.

279 Hence, of 1,684 registered public offerings between 1967 and 1970, institutional purchases accounted for 25 percent of the total; by contrast, during this
same period, it is estimated that institutional activity on the New York Stock Exchange, the largest secondary equity market, accounted for more than 50 percent
of all trading activity. INsTrrOnToNAL INVESTOR STMUY, supra note 225, at 2333.
The study also found that new issues constitute a relatively small portion of institutional portfolios. Id. 2323.
280 REIT FAcTnoox, supra note 1, at 6.
281
See note 6 supra.
282 See notes 168 & 169 supra & accompanying text.
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trustees and REIT advisers with respect to advisory fees, including
a requirement that certain categories of information be disclosed to
and considered by the nonaffiliated trustees, would significantly
temper the present incentives to increase portfolio size merely to
increase advisory fees. If the REIT trustees penalize substandard
earnings performance by demanding a reduced level of advisory
compensation, the adviser will have a strong incentive to avoid
28 3
excessive leveraging.
More stringent controls on loans to REITs from affiliated financial institutions could also limit incentives to finance investments
through excessive leverage. Section 23A of the Federal Reserve
Act2s4 imposes a limitation on loans by member banks to any one
affiliate of ten percent of the capital stock and surplus of the member, and an aggregate limitation of twenty percent with respect to
loans to all affiliates. The Federal Reserve Board has taken the position that the section 23A limitations do not apply to loan transactions between a REIT that is advised by a member bank or its
affiliate and the member bank. 28 5 However, given the objective of
section 23A, the reach of the statute should be extended to restrict
loans between a bank and a REIT sponsored by the bank.
Although the legislative history of section 23A is scanty, it is
clear that its primary purpose was to avoid exposing bank assets to
undue risk by committing them to the support of bank affiliates. 286
Implicit in the provision is a determination that loans to affiliates
involve potential conflicts of interest that create incentives to extend
loans that might not otherwise be extended. As discussed above,
similar artificial incentives to extend loans are characteristic of the
credit relationships between banks and bank-sponsored REITs,
27
whether or not the REIT is technically an "affiliate" of the bank. S
In recognition of this fact, recently-introduced federal legislation
would restructure section 23A to bring bank-sponsored REITs
within the definition of "affiliate," and thereby impose limitations
on the aforementioned loan transactions. 288 Although the legisla283 See text accompanying note 29 supra.

284

12 U.S.C. §371(c) (1976).

158 n.5
(1976); REIT Heaings, supra note 18, at 123-24 (statement of R. Schotland).
286
See P. HELLE1, supra note 285, at 160 nn.10-11.
287 See notes 250-54 supra & accompanying text.
The bill pro288 Banldng Affiliates Act, S. 2810, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
vides, in relevant part:
(2) DEFnrnoNs.
285 P. HELLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAw
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tion focuses on the protection of bank assets, the limitations on
excessive debt financing of REITs by their sponsor banks should
benefit the REITs as well as the banks.
The proposed amendment's limitations are not as likely to
affect adversely investment in primary real estate markets as those
of section 18 of the Investment Company Act. Unlike the Investment Company Act approach, a revised section 23A would not limit
debt financing by the imposition of asset coverage requirements;
it simply requires a bank-sponsored REIT to seek out other sources
of financing when its limits have been exceeded. Such a limited
incursion on REIT investment prerogatives is a cheap price to pay
for an effective limitation on debt leverage in bank-sponsored
REITs.
REITs and their institutional sponsors that are engaged in
parallel business activities should also be subject to more stringent
controls than are common management personnel. As previously
suggested, any regulatory legislation directed at REITs should require a minimum number of nonaffiliated trustees on a REIT's
board of trustees. 28 9 Under the proposed definition, no individual
could qualify as a nonaffiliated trustee if he was employed by, or was
a substantial shareholder in, the investment adviser or any affiliated
person of the investment adviser. With respect to those REITs
that are sponsored or advised by financial institutions who engage
in parallel business activities, it would be appropriate to require a
(a) The term "affiliate" with respect to a member bank means:
(iv) any company, including a real estate investment trust, that is
sponsored and advised on a contractual basis by the member bank or any
subsidiary or affiliate of the member bank.
In recommending the inclusion of bank sponsored BELTS as affiliates for purposes of the restrictions under § 23A, the Federal Reserve Board voiced a number
of concerns:
Such an extension of the statute recognizes that a bank may try to
rescue a financially troubled organization that is sponsored and advised by
the bank or its subsidiary or its affiliate in order to (1) prevent any damage to the reputation of the bank or its affiliate, or (2) forestall any lawsuits alleging that the sponsored organization received "bad advice" from
the bank or its affiliate. To the extent that advisory service revenues are
related to the size of the organization that is sponsored and advised, a
bank may also lend to the organization at preferential terms in order to
increase the size of the organization, thus boosting the advisory service
revenues received by the bank or its affiliate. In such situations, the
Board believes the transactions would not be at "arm's-length" and, therefore, should be subject to the limitations of Section 23A.
Letter from Arthur F. Bums to William Proxmire, and attachments (Mar. 7, 1978)
at 23-24 (footnote omitted) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review).
289 See notes 139 & 140 supra & accompanying text.
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greater percentage of nonaffiliated trustees on that REIT's board
than on the boards of those REITs that are not sponsored or advised by such entities.
In summary, the REIT's role as a financial intermediary in
primary real estate markets mandates a less restrictive regulatory
approach to the problem of excessive risk-taking than that embodied in the Investment Company Act. The imposition of asset
coverage requirements on REITs would unduly jeopardize their
ability to stimulate investment in an area of the economy that is
only now recovering from a devastating market collapse. The problems of excessive risk-taking and ill-conceived advisory compensation plans are inextricably related. If substandard earnings performance becomes a significant consideration in the setting of
advisory compensation, a major incentive towards excessive leverage
will be eliminated. In addition to this general approach, the special efforts outlined above are justified to regulate loan transactions
between REITs and affiliated financial institutions.
V.

CONCLUSION

As a financial intermediary, the REIT has been a highly significant force in channeling investment funds into the real estate
sector. It has provided real estate investment opportunities that
would otherwise have been unavailable to the small investor, and,
perhaps more significantly, has provided an important source of
risk capital to real estate entrepreneurs.
In the four years since the real estate collapse of 1974-75, the
REITs that have managed to avoid bankruptcy have made significant recoveries. Rising real estate prices coupled with significant reorganizations in capital structure and portfolio composition
have given many of the surviving trusts an opportunity to become
significant forces in real estate investment once again. 290 The potential importance and value of the REIT as a financial intermediary, as well as the possibility that REITs will indeed reassume
a dominant role in real estate lending and development, highlight
and reinforce the need for imposition of appropriate regulatory
controls.
290 See, e.g., Campbell, REITs Are Shifting from Dogs to Darlings as Realty
Markets Rebound from Recession, 19 NAT. REAL ESTATE INvESTOR 57 (1977); Carberry, Improved Picture for Some REITs Prompts Analysts to Look at Speculative
investments, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1977, at 23, col. 3; Drob, Will Fortune Smile
Again on Real Estate Investment Trusts?, 44 APPnAmSAL J. 450 (1976); Rudnitsky,
Speculating in White Elephants, FORBES, Dec. 1, 1977, at 79.
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At the time of the passage of the Investment Company Act,
mutual funds were a "relatively unimportant" part of the financial
structure of this country. 291 History has demonstrated that the
imposition of regulatory controls did not thwart the growth of
investment companies. 292 The Investment Company Act and the
legislation proposed in this Article embody specific legal responses
to the inherent problems of externally-managed financial entities.
The lessons of abuse of the advisory position and of the inadequacy
of existing regulation should not be lost. Regardless of the current
state of the industry, potential REIT investors should be assured
that their interests will not be sacrificed to those of the adviser
or its affiliates. Indeed, renewed investor confidence resulting from
appropriate regulatory safeguards may well foster substantial further
growth within the REIT industry.
This Article has suggested that the Investment Company Act
provides a useful starting point in the analysis of possible regulatory approaches to REITs. The structure of REITs and regulated
investment companies is sufficiently similar to raise common regulatory concerns in the areas of conflicts of interest in external management, fee structures, and risk-taking. The parallels, however,
are imperfect, suggesting that application of certain provisions of
the Investment Company Act to REITs, particularly in the prohibitions of affiliated transactions and the outright limitation on
debt leverage, may be inappropriate.
Given these factors, it is this author's conclusion that regulatory legislation directed at REITs should define the respective
fiduciary roles of external management and the trustees of the
REIT, with statutory guidelines specifying the factors to be disclosed to and considered by the trustees in the principal areas where
conflicts of interest may arise. If appropriate enforcement power is
vested in the SEC and if private causes of action are allowed, a
stringent fiduciary standard should adequately serve to ensure that
the REIT is managed prudently and in the undivided interest of
the REIT shareholders. In addition, the imposition of restrictions
on loans by banks to sponsored REITs should foster sounder capital structures by REITs, thus lessening the vulnerability of REITs
and REIT lenders to cyclical downturns in the real estate sector.
With time, of course, the foregoing approaches may prove inadequate, and strict prohibitions on affiliated transactions and debt
291 Wharton School of Commerce and Finance, A Study
REP. No. 2276, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1962).
292 PuBLic Pouicy ImcAmToNs, supra note 145, at 2.

of Mutual Funds, H.R.
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leveraging similar to those imposed on regulated investment companies, or even limitations going beyond those contemplated by
the Investment Company Act, may be required. As a first step,
however, the approaches suggested herein constitute a reasonable
approach to the regulation of REITs and REIT advisers and should
go far to provide needed safeguards in an important economic
sector.
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NOTES TO APPENDIX A
B.F. Saul Real Estate Investment Trust
(1) Prospectus dated March 12, 1974, at 45.
(2) "No express provision ... prohibits B.F. Saul Company (or its subsidiaries
or affiliates, including the Advisor) or any officer, director or employee of B.F. Saul
Company or the Advisor . . . from performing investment advisory services for
parties other than the Trust or from engaging in activities similar to or competitive
with the investment operations of the Trust or from making real estate investments
which might be suitable or desirable for the Trust." Id. 3.
(3) Id. 31.
(4) Trust may acquire mortgages from B.F. Saul Company only during the first
six months following the receipt of proceeds by the Trust from a public offering.
Id. 45.
Chase Manhattan Mortgage and Realty Investors
(1) Registration Statement on Form S-1 dated May 27, 1977, at 50.
(2) Id.
(3) ld.
(4) Trustees must determine that such transactions are fair and reasonable to
the Trust and are comparable to similar transactions with others not affiliated with
the Trust. Id. 65.
Citizens and Southern Realty Investors
(1) Includes principally (a) joint loan transactions between Trust and Adviser
($12.1 million principal amount, Dec. 31, 1977); and (b) loans to affiliates of
directors of the Adviser ($41 million during the period 1973-78). Registration
Statement on Form S-11, dated April 28, 1978, at 76-77. Under the terms of a
consent decree entered into between the Trust and the SEC on April 21, 1978, the
Trust has agreed not to extend any new loans in which the Adviser has an interest
or to issue any new commitments on loans made by the Adviser. Id. 73.
(2) Registration Statement on Form S-11 dated Apr. 20, 1978, at 68.
(3) Id.
(4) Trustees must determine that such transactions are fair and reasonable to
the Trust and are on terms no less favorable than those prevailing in arms-length
transactions involving persons not affiliated with the trust. Adviser (or affiliate)
must retain at least a 5%interest in any mortgage or realty interest sold to the Trust.
Declaration of Trust, as amended, Apr. 27, 1977, at 13.
Connecticut General Mortgage and Realty Investments
(1) Includes principally joint loans by Trust and parent of adviser. As of March
31, 1977, outstanding loan participations between Trust and advisory parent were
$237.1 million, of which the Trust's participations totalled $119.7 million. Trust
reserves right to make loans to affiliates of adviser, although it "does not presently
intend to enter into such transactions." Trust may purchase developed properties
from real estate development subsidiary of adviser's parent. Annual Report on Form
10K, Year Ended Mar. 31, 1977, at 3 and Annual Report to Shareholders (attached),
at 19.
(2) Annual Report on Form 1OK, Year Ended Mar. 31, 1977, at 7.
(3) "[The advisory agreement] provides that [the parent of the Adviser] will
provide access to the advisor to review each mortgage and real estate opportunity
presented to [the parent] and that [the parent] and the Trust each will be entitled
to participate in such of those investment opportunities which it deems suitable."
Registration Statement on Form S-11, dated May 19, 1971, at 22.
(4) Id.
(5) Trust will not purchase property from, sell property to, or make loans to the
Adviser or any officer, director, or employee thereof. Trust may enter into such
transactions with companies which are affiliated with Trustees, including Adviser's
parent, if terms are fair and reasonable to Trust and on terms at least as favorable
as in comparable transactions with nonaffiliated parties. Id.
Continental Illinois Realty
(1) Includes principally (a) issuance by the Trust of short term construction
loan commitments on properties in which a common contror' affiliate had acquired
equity interests (as of Sept. 1977, total purchase price of properties representing
such interests was $66.9 million), Registration Statement on Form S-11, dated Dec.
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27, 1972, at 32; (b) sale of participation by Trust to the parent of the advisory
company of $61.2 million; and (c) participation in certain construction loans by the
Trust and the parent of the advisory company. Annual Report on Form 10K, Year
Ending Mar. 31, 1977, at 45-46.
(2) Prospectus dated Aug. 30, 1974, at 4.
(3) Id.
(4) Id.
(5) Trustees are required to determine that such transactions are on terms which
are fair and reasonable to the Trust and are at least as favorable to the Trust as
similar arrangements for comparable transactions with others not having such
affiliation. Id.
Equitable Life Mortgage and Realty Investors
(1) As of Oct. 31, 1977, Trust's and Adviser's interests in joint loans were $409
million and $189 million, respectively. Annual Report on Form 10K, Year Ending
Oct. 31, 1977, at 11-12.
(2) Prospectus dated Oct. 29, 1970, at 25-27 (incorporated by reference in
Annual Report on Form 10K, Year Ending Oct. 31, 1977).
(3) Adviser must invest in each investment recommended to and taken by the
Trust on terms equal to those of the Trust in an amount equal to 10% of the aggregate loan amount. Annual Report on Form 10K, Year Ending Oct. 31, 1977, at
11-12.
(4) Prospectus dated Oct. 29, 1970, at 25-27 (incorporated by reference in
Annual Report on Form 10K, Year Ending Oct. 31, 1977).
(5) Trustees must determine transactions to be fair and reasonable and on terms
no less favorable to the Trust than in comparable transactions with nonaffiliated
persons. Prospectus dated Oct. 29, 1970, at 4.
IDS Realty Trust
(1) "Most of the Trust's investments are made in the form of participations in
loans made by the Adviser." Also includes (a) loans to a subsidiary of the Adviser
and (b) investments in joint ventures in which wholly-owned subsidiaries of the
Adviser have an interest Registration Statement on Form S-li dated Nov. 19,
1974, at 39-40.
(2) Id. 6.
(3) Id.
(4) Id.
(5) Trustees are required to determine that transaction is fair and reasonable to
the Trust and, in cases involving acquisitions of mortgages, that the acquisition is
on terms no less favorable than similar transactions, if any, known to the Trustees
not involving affiliated parties. Id. at 32, 50-51.
Lomas and Nettleton Mortgage Investors
(1) Includes (a) participations in loans by Trust and parent of Adviser; (b)
loans to entities affiliated with Trustees; and (3) long-term loan commitments by
Adviser's parent on construction loans made by Trust Preliminary Prospectus dated
Oct. 27, 1972, at 6, 27-28, 32-33, 36-37.
(2) Id. 6.
(3) In specified instances, Trust may require Adviser or its parent to participate
up to 15% of total of each loan recommended by the Adviser to the Trust (10% if
total participations of Adviser or its parent exceed $15 million). Id. at 32-33.
(4) Id. 6.
(5) All transactions must be on terms fair and reasonable to the Trust and on
terms at least as favorable as in transactions with nonaffiliated persons. Id. 27.
MONY Mortgage Investors
(1) Includes principally joint loan transactions between Trust and Adviser. At
May 31, 1977, the participations totalled $31.6 million and $95.4 million for the
Adviser and Trust respectively. Annual Report on Form 10K, Year Ending May 31,
1977, at 24.
(2) Prospectus dated Apr. 14, 1970, at 3-4.
(3) Adviser must participate at proportion of not less than 10 percent of all
long-term first mortgage loans made by the Trust. Annual Report on Form 10K,
Year Ending May 31, 1977, at 24.
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(4) Adviser is not required to present to the Trust any particular investment
opportunity, even of the type which could be taken by the Trust Trustees may,
however, upon review of investments made by the Adviser, ask for right to participate and the Adviser, "to the extent it deems it consistent with obligations to its
policyholders," may offer such participations. Prospectus dated Apr. 14, 1970, at 3-4.
(5) Id. 4.
Northwestern Mutual Life Mortgage and Realty Investors
(1) Includes principally (a) joint loans by the Trust and Adviser and (b) loans
by the Trust to entities in which the Adviser had an equity interest. At June 30,
1974, the participations (including unfunded commitments) totalled $150 million
and $326 million for the Trust and the Adviser respectively. Prospectus dated Oct.
29, 1974, at 49-50.
(2) Id. 7-8, 47-48.
(3) Trust may participate up to 10% in any loan accepted by the Adviser or its
affiliates "to the extent [the Adviser] deems it consistent with its obligations to its
policyholders." Id.
(4) Id.
(5) Trustees must determine that the transactions are fair and reasonable to the
Trust and on terms no less favorable than those obtainable in comparable transactions
with nonaffiliated persons. Id. 61-62.

REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
APPENDIX B
NONADVIsoRY COMPENSATION RECEIVED BY ADVISEnS oR AFFLATES oF ADvisEs

Name
B.F. Saul Real Estate
Investment Trust
Chase Manhattan
Mortgage and Realty
Trust
Connecticut General
Mortgage Realty
Investments
Continental Illinois
Realty
Citizens and Southern
Realty Investors
Equitable Life Mortgage
&Realty Investors
IDS Realty Trust

Lomas & Nettleton
Mortgage Investors
MONY Mortgage
Investors
Northwestern Mutual
Life Mortgage &
Realty Investors

Type
Property Management (1)

Amount
$1.2 million (yr. ending
Sept 30, 1977)

None Indicated
Loan Servicing (2)

$471,000 (yr. ending
Mar. 31, 1977)

None Indicated
Loan Servicing;
Transfer Agent;
Auditing (3)
None Indicated

$38,000 (9 mos. ending
Jun. 30,1977)

Loan Servicing;
Underwriting;
Registrar Fees;
Brokerage From Third
Parties (4)

$6 million (underwriting
fees by IDS);
$417,000 servicing fees;
$1.9 million brokerage
fees from third parties
(yr. ended Jan. 31, 1974)
Not Indicated

Loan Servicing (5)
Loan Servicing (6)
Commercial Paper
Endorsement
None Indicated

$39,622 servicing fees;
$20,633 endorsement fees
(yr. ending May 31, 1977)

(1) Annual Report on Form 10-K, Year Ended Sept. 30, 1977, at F-18.
(2) Annual Report on Form 10-K, Year Ended Mar. 31, 1977, at 19 (attached
Annual Report to Shareholders).
(3) Annual Report on Form 10-K, Year Ended Sept 30, 1977, at 35.
(4) Registration Statement on Form S-11, dated Nov. 19, 1974, at 6, 37-40.
(5) Preliminary Prospectus dated Oct. 27, 1972, at 37-38. Adviser and/or
parent may also receive fees from Trust or third parties for processing loan disbursements, property management, insurance, and handling escrows, reconveyances
and foreclosures. Id. 36.
(6) Annual Report on Form 10-K, Year Ended May 31, 1977, at 20, 25.
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APPENDIX C
LIMITATIONS ON LEVERAGE

Name
B.F. Saul Real Estate Investment Trust
Chase Manhattan Mortgage and
Realty Trust
Connecticut General Mortgage
& Realty Investments
Continental Illinois Realty
Citizens and Southern Realty Investors
Equitable Life Mortgage and
Realty Investors

IDS Realty Trust
Lomas &Nettleton Mortgage Investors
MONY Mortgage Investors
Northwestern Mutual Life Mortgage
and Realty Investors
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

Limitation
None (1)
None Indicated
300%of Net Assets (Excluding
Commercial Paper and Nonrecourse Indebtedness) (2)
None (3)
None Indicated
300%of Net Assets on
Prime Commercial Paper
10% of Total Assets on
Nonrecourse Debt
200% of Net Assets on
Government-Related Debts
300%of Net Assets on All
Other Debt (4)
800%of Net Assets (5)
500%of Net Assets (6)
400% of Net Assets (7)
500%of Net Assets (8)

Prospectus dated Mar. 12, 1976, at 17.
Registration Statement on Form S-11, dated May 19, 1971, at 15.
Registration Statement on Form S-11, dated Dec. 12, 1972, at 11.
Prospectus dated Oct. 29, 1970, at 17-18.
Registration Statement on Form S-11, dated Nov. 19, 1974, at 27.
Prospectus dated Mar. 14, 1972, at 12.
Prospectus dated Apr. 14, 1970, at 36.
Prospectus dated Oct. 29, 1974, at 38.

